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ABSTRACT 
The UN Security Council quickly authorized the use of force, and NATO allies speedily 
took action in March of 2011 to prevent a potential humanitarian crisis in Libya when it 
appeared to the international community that civil protest would be met with state 
sponsored violence on the level of genocide. How did the multilateral decision making 
processes in NATO and the UN, two separate but related organizations, work in this 
case? What forces led to a slow or fast decision? What factors contributed to international 
support for intervention, and what was the character of politics that led to action? The 
underlying multilateral decision making framework of each organization, a function of 
structure and original design, will be investigated and compared in light of an historical 
and in-depth study on multilateralism. Within the contemporary crisis management 
mindset of the last twenty years, it is easily forgotten that these organizations were 
created for other purposes. Their raison d'être was the prevention of catastrophic world 
war amongst great powers, not the management of small-scale crises or humanitarian 
interventions. Thus, their decision making in crisis management is blunt. Libya stands out 
as an exceptional case, with potential future implications on the use of force. 
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A. THE QUESTION 
How effective in the realms of policy and strategy has been the case of 
multilateral decision making on the use of force within international security 
organizations in the Libyan conflict of 2011?1 Well known is the fact that the UN 
Security Council quickly authorized the use of force2, and that NATO eventually took 
command of the operation to protect Libyan civilians until it was finished in October of 
2011.3  Less well understood by students of policy is how the multilateral decision 
making processes worked in each case, and what forces led to a slow or fast decision. 
Also, not well understood is the underlying decision making framework of each 
organization and its essence. Within the contemporary crisis management mindset of the 
last twenty years, it is easily forgotten that both organizations were created for purposes 
other than crisis management in the contemporary strategic landscape of United States 
hegemony.4 Their raison d'être was the prevention of catastrophic world war amongst 
great powers, not the management of small-scale crises or humanitarian interventions.5 
Thus, their decision making in crisis management is in a sense, colored by crayons from a 
different box. 
Forces of statecraft, national interests, and organizational particulars influence 
decision making. Of specific interest in this case are the forces, national interests, 
previous positions on policy, and organization structural tenets that effected national 
positions, the process of debate, and thus, the scope of decision making leading up to the 
intervention in the Libyan conflict of 2011. Which forces of policy, politics, and strategy 
                                                 
1 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection?  Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and 
the Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs vol. 87 no. 4 (July 2011). 
2 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1973 (2011). March 17, 2011. 
3 NATO website, “NATO and Libya: Operation Unified Protector,” accessed February 23, 2012 at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm.   
4 North Atlantic Treaty, The. Washington, DC, April 4, 1949. Accessed February 23, 2012 at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 
5 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I.  
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as well as personality and interest influenced the debate ? What effect did multilateralism 
have as a guiding principle of international relations?  In this connection, and 
specifically, why did a coalition of Western and Arab nations begin operations before 
NATO was willing to take command? What qualitative differences of policy and strategy 
as well as interest and personality existed at the UN versus NATO? What similarities can 
be discovered?  
The point of this study is to investigate how the UN and NATO came to their 
respective decisions in as much detail as is possible to reconstruct within a year and a half 
the events. How were decisions influenced by state participation in multilateral 
institutions? What is multilateralism in terms of a theoretical organizing influence in 
international relations? Is it something more than organization in groups of three or more 
states? Is there something materially different and influential about such an organizing 
mechanism? What factors influenced the key actors in their decision making at each 
organization and how did that result in the organization’s position and or action? How did 
the relationships of states to each other, to their national interests, national principles, and 
their tolerance for external crisis action affect their vote or advocacy on behalf of a 
particular course of action? What other consequential factors played into the decision 
making on Libya that may not have been present before? Was there anything special 
about Libya, i.e. the context, time period, or region in which the protests began that 
affected the decisions of the two organizations? 
As for the U.S., since the advent of the idea of the “Mission Defines the 
Coalition” at the time of the final war of Yugoslav succession in the late 1990s, U.S. 
statecraft has embodied a mixed attitude to the requirements of alliance cohesion and 
contemporary conflict between unilateralism and multilateralism and the requirements of 
alliance cohesion and statecraft.6 However, since 1998, this idea has undergone a  
                                                 
6 Patrick M. Stewart, “The Mission Determines the Coalition: The United States and Multilateral 
Cooperation after 9/11,” in Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in 
a Context of Changes in U.S. Security Policy ed. Bruce D. Jones et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 20-25. 
 3
significant evolution away from a multilateral approach and back again, which showed 
itself in the short, sharp Libyan conflict of 2011. What is the rationale for the U.S.’s 
conflicted position?  
What effect might the Libyan case have on future use of force decisions, 
considering it was a fundamental incorporation of the UN’s newfound doctrine of 
“responsibility to protect?”7 A comprehensive analysis has not yet been completed on 
decision making at NATO and the UN for this event.  While the event is too recent, the 
implications for policy and strategy are highly suggestive especially to students of 
strategy as well as observers of how nations deal with each other.8 
B. ARAB SPRING AND THE STATE SYSTEM 
The “Arab Spring” in North Africa in 2010 roiled the old order in the Middle 
East, leading to conflict in several countries.9  Demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya shared a common cause for personal dignity and responsive government.10 The 
violence shocked the world amid the seismic realignment of power associated with the 
popular uprisings among the North African and Arab nations.11 In Libya, what began as 
protests “by ragtag bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces”12 against the 
governing regime degenerated into violence and eventually full-scale civil war in late 
February 2011, when the government of Libya responded with the repression and 
                                                 
7 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 15, 2005. 
8 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection?  Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and 
the Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs vol. 87 no. 4 (July 2011). 
9 Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, May/Jun 2011, accessed March 
26, 2011 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67693/lisa-anderson/demystifying-the-arab-spring. 
10 Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, May/Jun 2011, accessed March 
26, 2011 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67693/lisa-anderson/demystifying-the-arab-spring. 
11 Although the protests started as an intrinsic response to disillusionment within the country, 
neighboring revolutionary movements and the phenomenon we now regard as the “Arab Spring” preceded 
them, formed expectations, and provided the context in which they began.  
12 Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, May/Jun 2011, accessed March 
26, 2011 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67693/lisa-anderson/demystifying-the-arab-spring. 
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violence that had been its hallmark since the late 1960s.13 High-level defections from the 
government, the ordering of large-scale executions, and the threatened use of armored 
fighting vehicles against civilians and civilian populated areas provided the impetus for 
an international opposition movement that appeared to have the overthrow of the 
internationally disliked dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, as its object.14 The hope that a new, 
more representative government might finally replace Gaddafi appealed to leaders and 
makers of opinion in the Western world, for whom the dictator had been since the 1970s 
a source of conflict and chaos.15  
Another fight for regime change in a Muslim country would dissuade the United 
States from initially projecting its leadership and offering its assistance, burdened as it 
was with the project of war termination in Iraq and Afghanistan.16 Thus, the genesis of 
the term, “leading from behind,” which came from an Obama administration official in 
an attempt to explain U.S. efforts to a domestic audience.17 Although ridiculed, it 
expressed the caution implied in the U.S. policy to avoid the limelight in area of the 
world where it is currently reviled for its existing interventions.18 The U.S. effort, 
although considerable, was disguised by the smaller, but more public efforts of others. 
Such notable and newsworthy actors as the UN, NATO, France, and the United 
Kingdom, as well as several neighboring Arab countries influenced the conflict in a 
material way, while the United States led initial efforts in command and control, 
apparently behind the scenes. These actors, in their number, intervened to protect the 
civilian population from mass atrocities expected from the declining regime. 
                                                 
13 Ian Black, ed., “Libya on brink as protests hit Tripoli,” The Guardian, February 20, 2011, accessed 
March 26, 2012 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/20/libya-defiant-protesters-feared-dead. 
14 Ben Barry, “Libya’s Lessons,” Survival vol. 53 no. 5 (October-November 2011), 1. 
15 Barry, “Libya’s Lessons,” 1. 
16 Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and 
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya,” Ethics and International Affairs, (2011), 4. 
17 Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and 
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya,” Ethics and International Affairs, (2011), 5. 
18 Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and 
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya,” Ethics and International Affairs, (2011), 5. 
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In an interdependent world in the Twenty-First Century, international 
organizations have gained an ever-larger influence on the global political scene amid 
debate about the meaning of this process.19  Such influential institutions as the UN and 
NATO are increasingly mentioned in the news as independent actors. Despite the desire 
of nationalists and unilateralists to exclude such organizations, their role is undeniable.20 
C. MULTILATERALISM 
The variety of international relations that led to the creation and perpetuation of 
these institutions is called “multilateralism.” This term, its meaning, its history, its 
politics, its incorporation into international organizations, and its theoretical 
underpinnings in contrast to other forms of international relations theory, such as 
bilateralism or unilateralism, will be examined in order to provide a basic understanding 
of theoretical effects on the forum in which states debate international security issues. 
This understanding will help to evaluate the decision making process of two relevant 
international security organizations. As John Gerard Ruggie, a professor of international 
relations and prolific writer on multilateralism suggested, “a core and concrete feature of 
current international institutional arrangements is their multilateral form. Why both the 
conventional literature on international relations and the literature on institutions should 
remain relatively silent on it…”21 should not affect its continued study, granted the 
significant role of multilateralism in organizations in real life versus the arcane realm of 
theory. Rather, the opposite is the case. The fact that multilateralism has been a key 
component of post-WWII international arrangements22 and little knowledge of its form 
exists indicates that further investigation of it is worthwhile.23 An investigation into the 
                                                 
19 Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal, 45:4 (1990), 
731. 
20 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe:” The Politics of International Socialization after the 
Cold War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 216. 
21 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization, 
46:3 (1992), 598.   
22 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997), 85. 
23 Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45:4 (1990), 
733-735. 
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meaning of multilateralism, its implementation in international organizations, and how it 
affects the decision making process will yield insight into a primary component of 
international organization that is largely unrecognized by theorists as well as by makers 
of policy.24 Critical influences on decision making include “generalized, expected, and 
consistent principles of conduct.”25 The multilateral form may be the means 
underpinning the influence of “principles behind conduct,” and therefore, a force in 
international politics in its own right. 
Open multilateral forums for international cooperation, such institutions as the 
UN and NATO, both of which the United States had a major hand in creating in the era 
after 1945, provide the arenas in which nation-states divulge their interests, intentions, 
motivations, and in which world opinion, as well as scrutiny by other democratic nation-
states that adhere to similar values, and other factors serve to influence state behavior 
along lines of previously agreed to pluralistic principles and values.26 In this case, threats 
from the long infamous leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, to use 
overwhelming force against the rebels inspired the interest of the greater international 
community, regional organizations, and a few powerful European countries who expected 
a refugee dilemma as well as sought to establish a sphere of influence as a kind of 
forward defense in what they deemed to be a long-standing security threat voiced in the 
halls of NATO since 1989, if not before when one considers the Suez adventure of 1956. 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) acted first to condemn27 and then, as we 
will see, to provide a mandate for external intervention in a state’s internal affairs without 
that state’s consent.28 The new “responsibility to protect” (R2P) policy of the United 
                                                 
24 James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for 
Foundations,” International Organization 46:3 (1992), 599. 
25 John G. Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” Perspectives on Politics 1:3 (2003): 
534. 
26 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe:” The Politics of International Socialization after the 
Cold War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 216. 
27 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1970 (2011). February 26, 2011. 
28 United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, 
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions.” 
UNSC Press Statement. March 17, 2011. 
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Nations, a multilateral expression of principles of conduct that has arisen from the 
security experience of the past twenty years, was to be tested for the first time in 
application since its official adoption in 2005. 
D. MULTILATERALISM AND DECISION MAKING 
The decision making process at the United Nations Security Council resulted in a 
resolution that authorized outside action to be taken on behalf of the citizens of Libya. 
The United States, France, the United Kingdom, and several other countries initiated 
efforts to establish a “no-fly zone” over Libya, with the United States reluctantly leading 
command and control for a little over a week.29 After a short time period, NATO agreed 
to take over the operation.30 The coalition of national actors relinquished their efforts to 
the command of the regional security organization of which they are all members or 
partners. Four non-NATO countries participated in the air operations: Jordan, Qatar, 
Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates.  Why did NATO take so long to come to the 
lead? What factors played into the decision making process at NATO that resulted in its 
taking over the operation? And, why did it not do so sooner? 
The nature and influence on the decision making process and procedures at the 
UN Security Council and the North Atlantic Council will be analyzed in light of the 
authorization of force, military operations, and “responsibility to protect” doctrine in the 
Libyan Conflict of the year 2011. Outstanding as elements of analysis stand such themes 
as specific and current national interests; longstanding national principles of statecraft, 
voting procedures, organizational membership and its own traditions and customs, and 
varying political and institutional tolerances for a willingness to authorize, or participate 
in military operations of any kind. The sum of these issues influenced the debate on 
whether outside parties should intervene in Libya. Once action was authorized, the most 
appropriate and capable security actor to wield force, NATO, did not immediately 
                                                 
29 Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, “Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after 
France gives way to Turkey,” The Guardian, March 24, 2011, accessed Feb 20, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/24/france-turkey-nato-libya. 
30 NATO. “Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Libya.” Press Release, 
March 27, 2011. 
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assume the lead for its own intriguing reasons that demand a close analysis. Instead, the 
debate involving the same factors took place in a separate, but somehow linked 
multilateral forum (the North Atlantic Council) with its own distinct traditions, customs, 
politics, interests, members, and responsibilities. The debate and decision making process 
at NATO differed in several key respects that demand analysis from the debate and 
decision making process that took place in the UN Security Council.  
The existing literature on the part of the topic relating specifically to 
organizational decision making on Libya is limited due to its recent nature. However, 
several articles of merit have been published on related topics in the immediate past. The 
timeline of events, procedural aspects of the organizations, news reports, and published 
speculation surrounding the votes or reports of advocacy of particular national actors will 
be investigated. The minutes of the North Atlantic Council are not accessible, nor are 
insider interviews with any of the key representatives. Several scholarly articles have 
touched on the concept of “responsibility to protect.” These works will form the 
foundation of research on that part of the topic. Additionally, official pronouncements 
from NATO and NATO governments, and published resolutions and press 
announcements from the UN will support the research. It is assumed that enough related 
literature exists in order to conduct an analysis of the topic and attempt to answer the 










The main thrust of the theoretical underpinning, definition, and application of 
multilateralism in international relations comes from Robert O. Keohane,31 John Gerard  
Ruggie,32 Miles Kahler,33 James A. Caporaso,34 Steve Weber,35 and Giovanni Grevi.36 
These writers define the term in depth, as will be seen in Chapter II, and provide much of 
the meaning behind multilateralism as a force in international politics. Keohane is useful 
for the initial, rough definition, and avoiding application of the term in too broad of a 
sense. To broaden it would be to weaken it and limit its usefulness. His definition limits 
multilateralism to state government interactions, avoids its application to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or multinational corporations (MNCs). Ruggie and 
Kahler provide evidence and in-depth analysis on the qualitative component of 
multilateralism. What is it about multilateralism that is characteristically different, 
besides the numbers involved, with bilateralism, unilateralism, or other ways of 
interacting in the international arena? Weber provides an historical review of 
multilateralism in NATO. American influence in the post-World War II era, creating 
international institutions for the preservation of peace offers insight into the post-Cold 
War period of multilateral cooperation. Grevi discusses the application of multilateralism 
in the contemporary time period as a means of mitigating expected changes in the 
international power structure. This is especially relevant as we examine contemporary  
 
 
                                                 
31 Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45:4 (1990), 
731-764. 
32 John Gerard Ruggie, ed. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. And “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” 
International Organization, 46:3 (1992) 561-598. 
33 Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” International Organization 46:3 
(1992), 681-708. 
34 James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for 
Foundations,” International Organization 46:3 (1992), 599-632. 
35 Steve Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” International 
Organization 46:3 (1992), 633-680. 
36 Giovanni Grevi, “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario,” Occasional Paper 79 Paris: EU Institute 
for Security Studies (2009), accessed January 15, 2012 at 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op79.pdf. 
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decision making in multilateral organizations on a particular case. Chapter II goes into 
detail on the theory of multilateralism and its historical precedent in the organizations 
under review. 
Decision making at the organizational level can be examined by comparing the 
organizational structure and methodology with the resultant reports, press releases, and 
actions. The timeline of these events is especially important. At NATO, the North 
Atlantic Treaty, press releases from Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as well 
as U.S. and European news articles provide material for the investigation. Stanley R. 
Sloan’s book, Permanent Alliance? provides a reference to current NATO issues and the 
organization’s evolution with current trends.37 Robert S. Jordan provides an historic look 
into the beginnings of NATO through biography of one its first supreme commanders, 
Lauris Norstad.38 Wallace J. Thies examines the way members bargain with each other 
over who will do what for a collective effort in his book, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and 
Burden Shifting in NATO.39 Additional books by Ian Q.R. Thomas,40 Anand Menon,41 
Ronald D. Asmus,42 Alexandra Gheciu,43 and a collection of essays edited by Gulnur 
Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore44 provide much of the background information for how 
NATO operates, what issues have characterized its evolution, and the forces involved in 
the tradition of its consensus based decision making tradition. The NATO website is 
                                                 
37 Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to 
Obama, (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2010.) 
38 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander, Airman, Strategist, Diplomat, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 2000.) 
39 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO, (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 2003.) 
40 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997.) 
41Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981-97: The Politics of 
Ambivalence, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.) 
42 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002.) 
43 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe:” The Politics of International Socialization after the 
Cold War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 216. 
44 Gulner Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore ed. NATO: In Search of a Vision, (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2010.) 
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another reference. Two scholarly articles, one an interview of the former SACEUR by 
David S. Yost,45 and the other a commentary on new ideas for decision making 
procedures at NATO from an American perspective by Leo G. Michel46 provide a unique 
perspective into the way decisions take place in the NAC. Ryan C. Hendrickson’s book 
on the NATO Secretary General is another source of key insight into NATO decision 
making through the influence of the Secretary General specifically. The difficulty with 
NATO is that the minutes and comments from meetings of the North Atlantic Council are 
not releasable until all member states have consented, which in the case of events of a 
half century ago, has yet to happen in certain cases.47 Another challenge is that certain 
key NATO nations chose to meet independently of the North Atlantic Council to make an 
initial decision on Libya. Part of the results of one such meeting was made public by a 
“Communiqué” posted by the French government and entitled “Paris Summit for the 
support to the Libyan People.”48 
At the United Nations a similar approach will be taken, but with some 
distinctions. The UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions provide the material to 
investigate the decision making process and procedures. Official UN Security Council 
Press Releases and reports provide voting results and explanatory commentary by 
individual states on the rationale for their votes. Scholarly articles by Alex J. Bellamy,49 
Paul D. Williams,50 Simon Chesterman,51 Thomas Weiss,52 and others on the 
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“responsibility to protect” doctrine and its effects provide insight and a means of 
understanding national commentary and voting behavior at the UN Security Council. 
Many of these articles are the most current, relevant, and specific scholarly articles on the 
Libya case, and on UN decision making on intervention in Libya. Also, official UN 
documents “Implementing the responsibility to protect,” by the UN Secretary General53, 
and the UN General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome document54 provide a 
background of institutional acceptance of this newfound phenomenon in international 
relations.  
The method chosen to conduct this analysis is one of comparison. A comparison 
of decision making in the UN Security Council and the North Atlantic Council, as well as 
an analysis of how multilateralism and one of its recently adopted principles of expected 
conduct, the “responsibility to protect,” affected the context and debate in each decision 
making forum. Many of the same actors participated in both organizations. How the 
major players interacted in one organizational context versus the other will be analyzed. 
The similar or different advocacy in different organizational contexts may offer some 
insight. Also, the lack of membership in one organization or the other may have affected 
the nature of the debate. The point of comparing the decision making of the organizations 
is to uncover what factors led to the “limited consensus” in multilateral format, for each, 
that allowed for the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” in the Libyan case.  
In the attempt to answer the initial question, the study is organized using the 
following framework:  a.) introduction; b.)  multilateralism; c.) decision making in the 
UN Security Council, d.) decision making in NATO, and e.) conclusion. The 
multilateralism section defines multilateralism, uncovers its nature, provides an historical 
account of its implementation in post-WWII Europe, speculates on its direction for the 
future, and most importantly provide its specific application to the organizations and  
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questions at hand. The chapter will ask the questions: What is multilateralism? How is it 
defined? What are its qualitative components? Where and how is it utilized? Where did it 
come from? What are its future prospects as a force in international politics?  
Next, this study will investigate, analyze, and compare the decision making at the 
UN Security Council first, and NATO second. In both cases, questions will revolve 
around decision making structure, procedures, membership, influences, principles of 
conduct, national considerations, and organizational dynamics. Since the material 
available for the two organizations is different, the analysis will differ in some respects. 
The hope is that the critical similarities and differences in these organizations in this 
particular case can be discerned and explained. Multilateral decision making can take 
many forms, which reflects the reality of the realm of statecraft in its variety. Comparing 
two organizations in one case has value because both dealt with similar information, but 
had different influences, roles, missions, and politics at work. The end result of their 
decision making is known, but the means, the process, the choice of path taken to get 
there is unclear at this point despite its significant implications for the character of war 
and peace in the present and future.  
A preliminary answer to the questions posed by this thesis as to the contemporary 
character of multilateralism and security will come in the conclusion. Effectively, 
multilateralism matters in organizational decision making on collective security matters. 
It is important not merely to the ends of crisis action use of force decisions, but to the 
purposes for which the organizations were originally designed: the prevention of world 
war among major powers. Consultations with allies, as in the case of NATO, and open 
forums that contribute to discussion and debate amongst world powers on contemporary 
security problems with the potential to destabilize the international system of states, as in 
the case of the UN Security Council, are minimally, multilateral mechanisms to reduce 
the uncertainty that leads to large-scale conflict, and at times, effective decision making 
structures on small-scale crisis action interventions. The most important factors of theory, 




in the evolution of force and statecraft that influenced organizational decision making in 
the Libyan case will be provided. Additionally, how the decision making that led to 
intervention in Libya may be of some future importance to a new generation of makers of 
strategy in the midst of rapid change. 
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II. MULTILATERALISM AND THE SYSTEM OF NATION 
STATES 
A. MULTILATERALISM DEFINED 
 A comprehensive and precise definition of multilateralism is important to 
understanding the complex meaning of the term and its usage as a critical component of 
the main argument of this investigation. The specific type of decision making being 
analyzed is the multilateral. What exactly does multilateral mean in regards to 
organizational decision making? Is it a loaded term in international relations theory with 
meaning beyond its simple conception? Multilateralism finds its most vaunted place 
among a specific niche of neo-liberal institutionalists and theorists and their explanative 
definitions begin this chapter. They include Robert O. Keohane,55 John Gerard Ruggie,56 
Miles Kahler,57 James A. Caporaso,58 and John G. Ikenberry.59 Additionally, 
multilateralism is used in the writings on the prospect of a multipolar system by Giovanni  
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Grevi,60 the EU’s CSDP by Jolyon Howorth,61 the EU in its relations with other 
organizations by Martin Ortega62 and by Marc Otte,63 and by Patrick Stewart64 in an 
essay investigating the U.S.’s conflicted contemporary position.  
 As will be investigated more thoroughly, the most simple conception of the 
term—organizing relations among more three or more participants—requires us to know 
much more than what type of participants, what type of relations, and what characterizes 
such relations differently, or the same, as some other sort of organizing mechanism in 
number, or quality? Additionally, what capacity has multilateralism as an organizing 
principle, been used in the genesis of organizations such as NATO?65 How has the 
evolution of multilateralism unfolded in NATO to its current place today?66 NATO is 
used in this chapter as the prime example of depicting multilateralism in its historic place 
as a force in international statecraft. Multilateralism was the organizing principle that 
joined previously antagonistic European nations and set up the international system using 
American principles of balancing power after WWII in what Stanley R. Sloan calls a 
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transatlantic bargain.67 In contrast, and for the purposes of deciphering the changing, and 
complicated U.S. position towards multilateralism, in relation to its contemporary support 
by the nations of Europe, the European Union, and specifically the EU’s Common 
Security and Defense Policy, will also be analyzed as an example of multilateralism in 
organizations.  
 One of the most preeminent political science scholars of institutionalism, Robert 
O. Keohane, describes multilateralism as “the practice of co-ordinating national policies 
in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of 
institutions.”68 He distinguishes multilateralism as specific to interstate relations and 
inter-government relations. Other transnational organizations or alliances, such as those 
in business or humanitarian aid remain outside of his conception of multilateralism.69 His 
definition is simply coordination between members of a group of nation states with more 
than two participants.  
Keohane further limits his definition with two main forms of state based 
multilateral arrangements: temporary, non-persistent, and ad hoc; or permanent, 
persistent, and institutional. The latter includes the creation of an institution, usually an 
international organization, to embody the “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal 
and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations.”70 The former exists on an ad hoc basis, is usually issue specific, of short 
duration, and designed to solve particular problems, which do not persist over a long 
period of time. These multilateral arrangements are temporary. If one was expected to 
persist, it would typically result in the creation of some sort of organization to monitor 
and manage the agreed on rules, and thereby transform into the latter form.71 Again, the 
main difference between the two forms involves whether the issue is of a temporary 
nature and can be solved by multilateral cooperation over a short period of time, or 
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whether it is an ongoing problem that requires an organization to monitor. Multilateral 
cooperation on persistent issues is organized by participation in international institutions. 
These organizations assist governments to develop expertise, monitor state compliance, 
and provide forums for discussion and policy changes on the particular issue area. 
International institutions, at least those of a multilateral form and which represent issues 
of an ongoing nature such as security, are a central tenet and perhaps the most enduring 
influence on multilateralism for Keohane.  
Expanding on Keohane’s definition, John Gerard Ruggie72 establishes a 
“qualitative” dimension to multilateralism. He argues that this is the key determinant 
differentiating the multilateral from other forms.73 Ruggie says, “what is distinctive about 
multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or 
more states, [Keohane’s definition] which is something that other organizational forms 
also do, but that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among 
those states.”74 This statement requires explanation on two counts. What are those other 
organizational forms? And, what are the certain principles to which he refers?   
B. MULTILATERALISM IN CONTRAST  
Two other forms of organizing interstate politics are bilateralism and imperialism. 
Bilateralism is normally thought of in the simple form as an arrangement made between 
two states. It is typically identified by its numerical component. A series of bilateral 
arrangements can be made between sets of states with each other on different issue areas, 
but each arrangement involves only two participants. The qualitative component, the part 
that describes the nature of the relations is more descriptive of the term. Bilateral 
arrangements are distinguished on one count by their exclusion of other states, and on 
another count by their reflection of the power relations that exist between the two states.  
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Miles Kahler says that bilateral agreements are “discriminatory arrangements that 
were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase 
international conflict.”75 For example, on trade agreements, A makes an agreement with 
B with particular protective measures in place. A then makes a different agreement with 
C with less restrictive protective measures in place. The relations between A and B, and 
A and C, are not equal, open, or based on a set principles to which many states could 
adhere. Rather they are based on specific interests, preferences, and the nature of 
competition between only A and B, and A and C respectively.  
Bilateralism then is based on a specific type of reciprocity,76 a balancing of costs 
and benefits between the two states in agreement with each other on a “tit for tat” basis. 
This basis is often biased in favor of one participant because one state typically depends 
much more on the other. It also involves only the states to the party, not universal 
principles or a concept of fairness that could be extended to other states. As a result, were 
B to realize that A was trading with C under less restrictive measures, it would desire the 
same treatment. Exclusive of other interests and considering only the factors in this 
example, A, the powerful state, desires a series of bilateral relations that it can influence 
with its power differential over B and C, in order to extract better terms for itself. 
Bilateralism then includes the descriptive components: agreements are made between two 
states with each other to the exclusion of other states, the nature of the agreements is 
based on specific reciprocity, and the agreements are not based on universal principles 
which can be extended to others, but are rather a reflection of the relationship of unequal 
dependence between the two states. 
Ruggie identifies imperialism as the third form of organizing states via 
institutional arrangements. This form, however, denies the sovereignty and dignity of 
subject states.77 Therefore, one or more strong states impose an imperial relationship on 
and to the detriment of weaker states, which did not necessarily agree to their 
exploitation. Imperialism was historically instituted through coercion and force. It 
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involved an asymmetric power relationship and a concept of a superior/inferior 
relationship, which prevented the establishment of any consensual agreement. 
Imperialism is now widely detested and most states avoid any mention of its tenets. The 
term is used by some to describe indirect forms of influence by the powerful over the 
weak, in an attempt to point out an exploitative type of relationship, i.e. “economic 
imperialism.” Multilateralism is distinguished from bilateralism and imperialism in a few 
important qualitative dimensions beyond the number of participants involved and the 
power relationships contained. Thus, the multilateral relationship must include 
characteristics that become meaningful amid the “social construction” of multiple states 
embracing them.78  
C. PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT 
Multilateralism is more than relations between three or more states. This does not 
mean it must involve all states in the world. It does mean that it must include more than 
two. Multilateralism then, coordinates relations based not on the specific, individual, and 
particular interests of the parties involved, but rather on general principles of conduct to 
which all can adhere and agree on in some form. These general principles of conduct then 
influence the socialization process as states explain their interests, justify their actions, 
and attempt to broker multilateral agreements that meet the criteria established in the 
general principles to which they have already agreed.  
The idea of “general principles of conduct” which states uphold entails two 
corollary concepts. The first is the idea of “indivisibility” and the second is that of 
“diffuse reciprocity.” Indivisibility includes the idea that the costs and benefits of 
collective action or agreement cannot be divided up among the states differently. It 
cannot be given only to those who adhere to the agreement. This concept includes the 
idea that states are sovereign and that they willingly enter into multilateral agreements or 
organizations of their own accord knowing that they will reap the benefits and suffer the 
costs of the collective agreement. There is typically no opt-out clause.  
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Diffuse reciprocity involves a rough equivalence of benefits afforded to all 
participants over the long term. It is distinguished from the specific reciprocity of 
bilateralism, wherein each agreement is based on the precise exchange between two 
participants. Diffuse reciprocity involves trust, belief in long term benefit, and confidence 
that the generally accepted standards of behavior will be in a state’s long-term interest. 
States willingly enter into multilateral arrangements, participate in multilateral 
organizations, and subordinate specific interests under the premise that the principles 
which will be adopted and socially enforced by group behavioral dynamics will 
ultimately be in their long term interest. If other states adhere to the principles they 
espouse, which they are more likely to adhere given that they have been made in public, 
rather than privately between only one other state, then the resultant collective action of 
several states over the long term will eventually benefit all roughly equivalently.  
Ruggie also distinguishes between international orders, regimes, and 
organizations, demonstrating unintentionally the increasing institutionalization of the 
phenomenon of multilateralism, but also showing that multilateralism is not tied 
exclusively to international organizations. Multilateral intergovernmental organizations 
have increased from 100 in 1945 to over 600 in 1980.79 An order depicts an existing 
international condition to which several states adhere and includes a concept of equal 
access to a common good. It does not say how that order is achieved.80 A regime 
“encompasses principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which 
actor expectations converge,” 81 but does not necessarily have a separate organizational 
structure from the states party to the regime. An organization is a formal and separate 
entity with a physical headquarters, staff, voting procedures, interest in self-perpetuation, 
etc. Ruggie argues that multilateralism should not be confused with international 
multilateral organizations exclusively and especially with any particular institutional 
expression of it. He additionally differentiates what makes multilateral institutions, in 
whichever form—order, regime, or organization—multilateral, beyond the numbers of 
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states involved. Ruggie’s definition of multilateralism is an expansion of Keohane’s 
definition: a form of coordinating behavior among three or more states on the basis of 
generalized principles of conduct. It is the qualitative component of “generalized 
principles of conduct” which can be further investigated in particular cases to yield 
additional insight on the nature of the multilateral form. 
D. MULTILATERALISM IN DEPTH 
Returning to a theoretical discussion of multilateralism, and defining it more 
specifically now in order to investigate its underlying drivers more fully: multilateralism 
organizes interstate relations in groups of three or more states and encompasses the 
concepts of indivisibility, diffuse reciprocity, and generalized principles of conduct. 
James A. Caporaso expands on these three concepts. He says that indivisibility can be 
thought of as the scope over which costs and benefits are spread.82 Collective security is 
an example. Security is indivisible. An attack on one is considered an attack on all. This 
is not true technically, but considered as such socially, by sacred agreement, and by state 
commitment.  
Diffuse reciprocity emphasizes that states expect to benefit in the long run 
through their loyalty to the organization and their adherence to its rules. They expect to 
benefit over many issues, rather than every time on every issue.83 This contrasts with the 
“tit for tat” type of reciprocity typical of bilateral arrangements.  
Generalized principles of conduct are norms of behavior “exhorting general if not 
universal modes of relating to other states, rather than differentiating relations case-by-
case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a priori 
particularistic grounds.”84 What underlies these generalized principles of conduct? Most 
simply, the idea of deciding in advance what appropriate state behavior entails on a given 
issue area.  
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Although existing interests and perceptions of participants affect the debate in a 
multilateral forum, several additional institutional characteristics also significantly affect 
the outcome of multilateral negotiations. Institutions shape preferences by providing an 
environment in which socialization and learning can occur. That makes it easier to punish 
free riders and defectors. The continuous contact, exchange of information, and education 
can alter perceptions. Institutions provide forums for discussion that can increase trust 
and reduce uncertainty about the actions of others. They ease coordination problems and 
promote adherence to norms.85 Institutions provide the means for multilateral debate to 
spawn new solutions to problems through the open and communicative nature of its 
discourse.  
Negotiation theory of the past used to emphasize hard line approaches, deception, 
and withholding of information. Today, negotiation theory espouses mutual sharing, a 
slow building up of trust and communication between the parties, and consecutive 
divulgences of information with associated value assessments. The idea is to discover 
differences in what each party value so that a better agreement can be reached where both 
parties get more of what they want. More often than not with hard line approaches and 
deception, one party realizes it is being deceived and withdraws from the negotiation, 
purposely sacrificing chances for gain in order to punish the other for the violation of 
trust. The new approach to negotiation emphasizes communication, an indirect approach 
with a focus on the possibility of a long-term relationship over short-term profit, and 
open exploration of value differences that can be exploited by both parties for mutual 
gain.  
Multilateral institutions provide a similar means for states to come together on 
particular issue areas and discuss appropriate forms of behavior. Through the process of 
discussion and debate, i.e. through divulgence of the merits and costs of particular 
proposals on particular state interests, learning can occur, trust can be built, 
understanding of other positions can be achieved, socialization of ideas in general can 
take place, and more workable, attainable, agreeable solutions to multi-state problems can 
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be invented. Additionally, many ideas that were not considered feasible before being 
socialized may in fact turn out to be workable after their merits and consequences have 
been thoroughly vetted. In this context, multilateral institutions present a considerable 
opportunity for more effective international agreements, with greater adherence by 
participating states, and which carry greater legitimacy if for no other reason than the 
nature of the multilateral institutional context from which they were born.  
Generalized principles of conduct, and the institutional forum in which they exist, 
i.e. international organizations, incorporate numerous qualitative benefits beyond their 
simple conception. It takes time, cost, and a sense of governmental patience to navigate 
the constraints of multilateral decision making forums. However, such institutional 
forums offer the promise of better solutions to international problems. Societies should 
not expect instantaneous results to complex global governance challenges.  
E. MULTILATERALISM IN NATO 
How did multilateralism arrive as a force in the realm of international politics? 
The incorporation of multilateralism in the post-WWII era in Europe is covered by Steve 
Weber in his article, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO.” 
He describes two competing sets of ideas that drove U.S. foreign policy makers in the 
immediate period after WWII and how they evolved during the following era. The first 
set of ideas was political in nature and derived from fundamental beliefs regarding the 
balance of power and the desired number of poles in the international system. The second 
set of ideas concerned the military and command/control considerations of nuclear 
deterrence.86 Over time, the military considerations of strategic nuclear deterrence 
increased in precedence in American foreign policy thought. They overtook the political 
ideas that dealt with the establishment of a multipolar system as a means of mitigating 
Soviet power and providing stability to the international system.  
NATO first emerged in 1948–1949 as one entity amongst a variety of institutions 
designed to promote security, international cooperation, and progress in the transatlantic 
                                                 
86 Steve Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” International 
Organization 46:3 (1992): 634. 
 25
relationship between Europe and the United States. The idea was to construct multilateral 
institutions to rebuild Europe unlike the failed effort in 1919, different from the 
conditions and small coalitions that led to WWII, but with some form of political 
integration that would allow a united and anti-communist Europe to become the third 
pole in a multipolar system. It was thought that this was the best way to balance against 
the rising Soviet Union and their communist expansionism. A bipolar system of 
competitive, antagonistic, and unyielding ideologies was thought would lead to another 
catastrophic war.87  
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennan all believed that U.S. support was 
crucial to rebuild Europe. They wanted to do it in a multilateral manner and with the help 
of multilateral institutions. Multilateralism was the organizing principle that would join 
previously antagonistic European nations and set up the international system using 
American principles of balancing power. This was the means to develop a multipolar 
system: the desired end state. A European pole according to Kennan would “restrain the 
Soviets and the Americans from taking too many foreign policy risks and from indulging 
in crusades to reshape the world in their own image.”88 It was widely believed that a 
multipolar system was the most stable international order, would balance against the type 
of power politics which drove the European nations into WWII, would avoid the system 
of bilateral alliances which caused WWI, and would therefore be the key ingredient in 
creating the conditions for the peace and stability. International stability would be 
conducive to long term U.S. prosperity.89 These foreign policy experts during this time 
period consciously resisted quick fixes to European security dilemmas, a system of 
bilateral agreements, and other seemingly short-term solutions to solving the security 
problems of European allies separately with U.S. military commitments.  
The development of NATO was initially influenced by these beliefs. In its initial 
signing, it was designed to bind the United States to European security concerns.90 It was 
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completely multilateral in form and nothing in the treaty provided the United States a 
privileged position within the alliance. It was not until the Korean War91 that concerns of 
Soviet invasion and the requirement for a large land army stationed in Europe required 
further leadership and integrated coordination of large military operations.92 This new 
requirement necessitated leadership, changed NATO’s form, and because the United 
States provided strong counterbalancing leadership, it also enabled increased French-
German cooperation, wherein French concerns of German military power were somewhat 
mitigated by the U.S. promise of continued involvement.93    
An investigation of a few key articles in the North Atlantic Treaty shows how the 
concepts of multilateralism were incorporated into NATO’s structure from the beginning. 
Article II in includes the idea of peace through institutions and economics. “The Parties 
will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international 
relations by strengthening their free institutions…They will seek to eliminate conflict in 
their international economic policies…”94 The link between economic recovery and 
political stability was first made by George C. Marshall in a speech at Harvard University 
in 1947.95 This link was manifest in the Marshall Plan and the Economic Cooperation 
Act of 1948, which tied Europe’s receipt of U.S. economic aid to European cooperation. 
Another belief, affecting U.S. foreign policy during the end of 1948 and beginning of 
1949 involved the idea that the “principal threat to Europe was political rather than 
military, [and] that the most effective means for dealing with the threat was economic 
recovery.”96 Continuing along the same logic, the idea of the importance of well-aligned 
economic policies designed to assist European recovery and the ideas of incorporation  
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into institutions to support implemented economic policies, was put into Article II of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, ensuring that the link between economic and political 
stability remained.97  
The economic and multilateral institutionalism mentioned in Article II was also 
the foundation for the ability to maintain an Article III capacity individually and 
collectively, a healthy budget being necessary to the maintenance of a military defensive 
capability. Article III states, “the Parties…will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack.”98 The idea behind a collective capacity to 
resist armed attack along with the rise of the Soviet Union perceived as a threat to 
Western security evidenced by the Czech coup in February 194899 and the Berlin 
blockade of June 1948, in conjunction with the actual events surrounding the Korean War 
and communist expansionism, served as the impetus for the organization of NATO, i.e. 
the expansive “O”100 which came consequentially out of the North Atlantic Treaty.101 
This was hastened by the previous mentioned events, as well as not necessarily by initial 
design. Article III assists to encourage the manifestation of the institutionalism of Article 
II. 
Another multilateral characteristic of Article III arises out of the collective 
capacity to resist armed attack. By mutual dependence on each other, parties to the treaty 
became involved in each other’s national budgets, defense expenditures, and monitoring 
of the burden sharing to maintain a collective capacity.102 This characteristic resulted in 
the “bargaining and burden shifting rivalry” explained by Wallace J. Thies in his book 
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Friendly Rivals.103 He explains that a critical component of the transatlantic bargain, and 
a key descriptive component explaining member state behavior towards each other has 
been the idea that burden sharing is burden shifting.104 Each major player attempted to 
frame security concerns to the alliance as a whole in terms that pled their own domestic 
poverty or decreased their responsibility to the collective and subsequently necessitated 
an increased share of the collective burden to be placed on their allies.105 Although this 
behavior may not explain multilateral decision making as will be investigated in the next 
chapter, it does explain the intimate involvement in each other’s domestic, economic, and 
military affairs by members of the alliance. It also, in conjunction with consultation in 
Article IV and the North Atlantic Council in Article IX, demonstrates NATO’s 
dependence on member state engagement with each other, all of which is based on the 
qualitative aspect of multilateralism that materially differentiates it from other decision 
making mechanisms: generalized principles of conduct. 
Article IV is the idea of consultation. It states that “the Parties will consult 
together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”106 Security serves as a catch 
all, since in some form, it is always being threatened. However, the article necessitates 
member states to consult together, putting forward a semblance of unity and setting in 
motion the meeting that could lead to collective action. Additionally, the idea of 
consultations, of bringing up issues for discussion and debate amongst allies, whether by 
invoking Article IV due to a security threat, in meetings of the North Atlantic Council or 
its committees, or even via ad hoc means, is a multilateral form of engagement. 
Consultations with trusted partners are governed by rules of persistent engagement, i.e. 
the generalized principles of expected conduct of the multilateral form. Allies cannot 
openly deceive each other on one issue, or they would not be trusted on the next, nor 
considered dependable to be in alliance with.  
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The North Atlantic Council of Article IX met for the first time on September 17, 
1949 in Washington with Dean Acheson as the chair.107 It created an organizational 
structure, facilitated the development of an integrated defense plan, and began the process 
of creating and delegating to committees the accomplishment of specific tasks.108 Article 
IX called for a defense committee specifically, which was created, and other subsidiary 
bodies as deemed necessary.109 After 1949, the concept of the north Atlantic as a 
“community” became a central feature of public rhetoric by Acheson and others.110 A 
community is based on shared principles and common consent—the same underlying 
features of multilateral engagement. Acheson explained that the alliance must give first 
priority to the establishment of an integrated defense, in line with American strategic 
thinking which viewed the Cold War in militaristic terms, but must not lose sight of the 
larger objectives of building strong economic, social, and political institutions.111  
When Eisenhower became president, he attempted to increase the efficiency of 
NATO and reduce U.S. expenditures on defense through an increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons and a strategy of “massive retaliation.” He also attempted to deepen multilateral 
principles in NATO, which had been compromised with the growth of influence for the 
United States that American leadership in the alliance entailed. He tried to spread nuclear 
weapons to the U.S. allies that were major European powers. He thought that nuclear 
self-sufficiency would integrate Europe more effectively and contribute to the desired 
third force, thereby creating a multipolar system. He failed.  
In 1956, the North Atlantic Council adopted a report conducted by the 
“Committee of Three on Nonmilitary Cooperation.”112 It was put together by what 
became known as the “three wise men,” Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino of Italy, 
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Halvard Lange of Norway, and Lester Pearson of Canada.113 They emphasized the need 
for better consultation among the members of NATO and for a stronger Secretary 
General.114 Their findings observed that consultations with allies should entail the 
discussion of problems collectively and initially, rather than consist of restatements of 
previously fixed national positions. The objective was to work out better solutions before 
national policies had become hardened and difficult to change.115 The effect of this report 
on future alliance rhetoric was that it provided justification for any NATO problem.116 
Problems were blamed on a failure of one or another member to adequately consult, in 
multilateral form, with their allies. Regardless, it emphasized the importance and quality 
of consultations, provided justification for their continuance, and served as a point of 
evidence for the good of multilateral debate. 
Nuclear strategic thinking made the passage from “massive retaliation” to 
“flexible response” which necessitated tighter command and control of all U.S. and 
European nuclear weapons by the U.S. government. Under Kennedy in 1961, U.S. policy 
implemented as National Security Action Memorandum 40 (NSAM-40) effectively 
replaced the multilateral organizational principles within NATO designed to create a 
European pole of power, through the spreading of nuclear weapons. Multilateralism, as a 
force in U.S.-European relations became secondary to nuclear strategy, although in the 
1960s NATO reinforced its political purpose all the same. U.S. leadership influenced the 
organizational structure within NATO for strategic nuclear deterrence. Nuclear launch 
authority would exist exclusively in the hands of the U.S. President. This provided a 
nuclear security guarantee for Europe, but it was a fundamental shift in U.S. policy on the 
control of nuclear weapons by European allies.  Nonetheless, NATO did offer such allies 
as the British and the West Germans a means to influence such decisions, while the 
French left eventually left the military structure in 1966. The North Atlantic Council, 
previously a more equal multilateral forum empowered with political control of NATO, 
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degenerated into a mere advisor to the U.S. government when it came to nuclear 
concerns, which were the most important decisions to be made concerning security and 
defense during this time period. In terms of the provision of an indivisible good, i.e. 
security, NATO reflected multilateral principles. However, from 1961 until 1989 the 
NAC as the primary decision making body for the alliance was somewhat overshadowed 
by U.S. governmental decision making power and responsibility much a result of nuclear 
strategy and competition with the Soviet Union.  
At a time of upheaval amongst allies with the French withdrawal from the 
integrated military structure, the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel urged the 
alliance to study which future tasks it should face.117 The subsequent report that this 
effort resulted in was called the Harmel Report. It was adopted by the NAC at its 
December 1967 meeting118 and was characterized as a description of the goals for which 
the alliance seeks: defense and détente.119 It outlined two main tasks: to maintain the 
military strength and political solidarity of the alliance; and to pursue a more stable 
relationship with adversaries, i.e. détente.120 The Harmel Report is credited with 
providing NATO a new sense of direction and purpose in the aftermath of the French 
withdrawal, which threatened its continued vitality.121 Although détente was largely a 
bilateral phenomenon between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Harmel Report 
provided a role for NATO, and observed that certain aspects required multilateral 
solutions.122 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe and the 
fate of Germany were two.123  
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It was the multilateral realm of MBFR that provided the alliance as a 
whole, and particularly the smaller allies, with an opportunity to enter the 
complex web of negotiations and linkages that comprised détente. By 
initiating a multilateral effort, NATO was expected not only to serve as 
the framework for military preparations against communist aggression, but 
also to provide the political framework for negotiations with its 
communist adversaries.124 
The Harmel report reinforced the alliance’s role in and dependence on multilateral 
engagement as opposed to an exclusive bilateral détente between major powers. 
Since 1989, a series of unilateral or U.S.-led “coalitions of the willing” has 
colored the debate within the NAC and affected a continued debate on U.S. hegemonic 
responsibility for world order versus alliance cohesion, i.e. U.S. support for the 
multilateral principles which the United States espoused as the means for peace and 
stability in the post-WWII landscape. The U.S. engaged in unilateral action at times, built 
a coalition of willing actors outside the existing NATO alliance structure at others, and 
supported multilateral engagement when it seemed politically convenient. This behavior 
forms part of the evolution of the development of NATO and the U.S. relationship within 
it in the post-Cold War landscape.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO faced fundamental questions of its 
purpose in the world. By the end of the 1990s however, it had transformed itself and 
become a completely different security organization.125 A series of reforms, expansions, 
and retooling for peacekeeping, i.e. crisis actions of several sorts took place. One of the 
first notable changes and expansions was the unification of Germany. “On October 3, 
1990, Germany was officially reunified—as a member of NATO.”126 This action 
signified an eastern expansion, a partnership with Russia, and the overcoming of Cold 
War mentalities. According to Ronald D. Asmus in his book Opening NATO’s Door, the 
Clinton Administration was especially supportive of expanding NATO’s membership to 
Eastern Europe, but doing it in a way to build a new cooperative relationship with 
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Russia.127 NATO became involved in securing and stabilizing former adversaries.128 
“German reunification, declining defense budgets, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Europe, and the rise of the European Union…led to the emergence of new ones 
[conceptions] surrounding the extraordinary nature of NATO’s form and 
function.”129The extraordinary nature of NATO’s form led it to the debate on small-scale 
military interventions. “For the first time in its history, NATO engaged in military air 
strikes: first on Bosnian Serbs in 1994 and 1995, and then in Kosovo and the wider 
Yugoslavia in 1999.”130 By the end of the 1990s NATO had become a tremendously 
important security organization for entirely different purposes. During the Cold War, its 
main objective was the containment of communism and avoidance of war with the Soviet 
Union. After its transformation, it became a stabilizing force for new Eastern European 
democracies, a force for crisis action, and a considerably expanded organization both in 
membership and in its role as an actor in international security actions.  
Today, NATO is effectively a multilateral organization composed of twenty-eight 
member states, numerous partnerships and dialogues with other states, and organizational 
relationships with other multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the 
European Union. In many regards it is still strongly affected by U.S. decision making 
power and responsibility. The unique nature of U.S. power projection capability and 
willingness, the U.S. role in the position of the SACEUR, and other characteristics of 
U.S. burden sharing, i.e. threat of pulling away from Europe, encourage its overwhelming 
influence.131 However, as was seen in the debate over Iraq in 2003, even the influence of 
the United States cannot force alliance action, or member state participation in conflicts 
they do not support. In the contemporary landscape, the privileged position of the U.S. 
has changed form, but still exists. 
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F. MULTILATERALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Despite an arguable U.S. retreat from multilateralism as the foremost principle for 
organizing international politics since September 11, 2001, if not before, the nations of 
Europe have together more thoroughly embraced the principle. This is evident in the 
development of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). 
The development of such a policy within the multilateral framework of the European 
Union demonstrates the viability of institutions as influential forums for debate and 
agreement on substantial changes to national policies on serious affairs such as defense 
and security. According to Jolyon Howorth, from 1947–1997 Europe was stifled by a 
security dilemma resulting from different interpretations of Washington’s response to a 
serious European military capability. London feared U.S. defection from Europe if they 
developed their own security mechanism. Paris assumed the United States would take 
allies more seriously if they took themselves seriously.132 As a result, no significant 
European security policy outside of NATO could be developed. The main players could 
not agree. The summit at Saint Malo in 1998 changed this deadlock and permitted the EU 
to embrace security and defense as a policy area. As a consequence, considerable debate 
was initiated on the issue.133 This led to the eventual emergence of CSDP. An 
investigation of the rational for the EU’s development of CSDP, through the use of its 
multilateral institutional forum, yields additional insight into the importance of 
multilateral principles to Europe and in international politics in general. 
Howorth identifies five underlying forces for why the EU became an actor on the 
security scene: the end of the Cold War lessened the strategic importance of European 
security for the United States; UN sanctioned humanitarian intervention was undermining 
state sovereignty and redefining international norms which transcended the state system 
(an expertise of the EU); the reappearance of military conflict on European soil (Serbia 
and Slovenia); the desires of the EU to be a political actor vice merely an economic one 
necessitated a military capability; and there was a need to strengthen the competitiveness 
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of European defense industries or they would wither and die.134 On the first point, fearing 
U.S. withdrawal from European security, the EU sought to begin the process of 
developing a separable security and defense capability. Although NATO remained the 
most important security provider to the European continent, the development of a 
military capability that could be employed for crisis management without U.S. leadership 
became desirable. However, the EU sought to develop this capability under the auspices 
of a more genuine and equal multilateral framework. Accepting the limitations that this 
framework would entail, it was thought that the process was as important as the product. 
This prioritization of slow cooperative development has costs in effectiveness, however it 
has benefits in cooperative experience. It demonstrates the leading nature of the EU today 
on the development of international cooperation and innovations in multilateral, regional 
intergovernmental governance.  
On the second point, the EU sought to become a contributor to the international 
debate on the transcendence of state sovereignty for normative humanitarian purposes, 
later labeled the “responsibility to protect.” Not only did this new involvement in other 
states’ internal affairs revise historic conceptions on the justification of war, but it 
encouraged such actors as the EU, to be in leadership positions to establish the new rules 
by which such interventions could legitimately occur. For over 50 years, the EU and its 
institutional predecessors expanded the multilateral framework amongst its member 
states and reached beyond state sovereignty for mutual benefit. Of considerable interest 
to an individual values-based Western society, justified humanitarian intervention seemed 
an avenue to establish international norms for the good of the global community. The EU 
desired to contribute to this discussion by being capable of acting within it. Such 
capability required more than exclusively civilian instruments. It necessitated an 
independent military capability for peacekeeping. 
On the third point, conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s exposed the need for 
Europe to be able to keep its own continent in order. Resorting to national forces would 
undermine the multilateral nature of EU relations and it was not necessarily in the interest 
of any particular European nation to act independently. Additionally, relying on NATO 
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support was akin to relying on the United States for a small-scale intervention that should 
be able to be handled by a European security force. Unfortunately, Europe at this time 
was not capable of a small-scale intervention without U.S. assistance. The two defining 
characteristics concerning the establishment of CSDP within the framework of the EU 
were its truly multilateral character and its autonomy from NATO.   
On the fourth and fifth points, further political and military integration supported 
the increasing influence of the EU as an independent actor in world politics. The ability 
to carry out mandates, the capability to enforce the legitimacy of its multilateral 
governance process, and the willingness to act under a peacekeeping mission requested 
by the UN, a larger multilateral organization, would create the actions able to accomplish 
actual change, i.e. missions. Advocated by member states, it would do so only by joint 
intervention of multiple states without selfish national interest or specific short-term gain. 
This created additional legitimacy and increased the utility of the EU as an actor on the 
international stage. As long as the actions of its security and defense capabilities are 
employed with multilateral legitimacy for the creation of stability and peace, the EU will 
be benefitted by world opinion as an organization. Economies of scale, state subsidies, 
and other economic factors encouraged the expansion and consolidation of defense  
industries into larger organizations. Without consolidation of European defense 
companies, competitiveness would decline and they would become subcontractors for 
larger foreign firms.135  
Why has the establishment of multilateralism as a firm principle underpinning the 
EU’s CSDP been constrained by NATO and by the United States? What underlies 
tension in and around multilateralism in the United States? Why does the United States 
not support multilateralism now as it did in the late 1940s and 1950s? What is it about the 
nature of the international system today and the U.S. role within it that seems to make the 
United States prone to unilateral action and averse to adhere to the international 
constraints established by multilateral forums? Has the United States forgotten its history 
and role in establishing the organizational framework of multilateralism? These are the 
questions to which we now turn.  
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G. CONFLICTED POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES 
The current U.S. perspective on multilateralism contrasts considerably with its 
position prior to 1961. The United States is torn between the “desire to act through 
multilateral institutions—offering broad acceptance and legitimacy even if it can be 
difficult—on one hand and the temptation to act unilaterally—the more efficient and 
often more promising option—on the other.”136 For a state with global responsibilities 
and possessing the capability to act independently to solve international problems, the 
allure of unilateral action is ever present. Also, intellectual criticism of multilateralism as 
an effective force in international politics continues to affect the discourse and thus 
policymakers in the United States. Critiques include the following: the UN Security 
Council has failed to ensure a global system of collective security; criticism of the 
concept of collective security in general; criticism of multilateralism to attain the ends for 
which it seeks; the undue burden multilateral solutions tend to place on large states; the 
open and public nature of multilateral negotiations; cases of incompetence, overspending, 
and other organizational complications for existing multilateral institutions; and the idea 
that multilateral institutions such as the UN have been more of a liability than an asset to 
the maintenance of international order.137 The countervailing opinion to these criticisms 
contends that multilateral institutions are beneficial, worth their cost, and that “the United 
States needs international cooperation to increase the legitimacy and long-term effect of 
its actions (nation-building depends more on the population than the external influence 
that removed the dictator) and thus should pursue multilateral solutions wherever and 
whenever possible.”138 “As long as the United States retains such a strong international 
presence, it must learn how to be a hegemonic power without acting like one…it 
nonetheless needs cooperation with allies and international institutions to legitimize use 
of force, win the peace.”139 The U.S.’s conflicted position on multilateralism involves its 
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unique position in the world, its desire for efficient use of projected power, and the 
complicated nature of appeasing the short term desires of a domestic audience for 
effective action versus long term solutions. 
The United States is plagued by its extensive international involvements, its 
conflicted viewpoint as a force for progress and as the world’s policeman. U.S. support 
for multilateralism is conflicted, but its support for multilateral institutions remains. 
Every action is weighed between interests and values, a result-based orientation versus a 
process-based perspective, efficiency versus legitimacy. Extensive power projection 
capabilities, domestic political challenges, and the assumption of considerable costs are 
balanced against the desire for short-term results versus long-term solutions. The 
common theme running through U.S. decision making involves a similar strategic 
calculus as that made in 1961 of U.S. controlled nuclear response over multilateral 
political considerations. In the contemporary time period, fifty years have elapsed since 
the U.S. attempt to impose a multilateral world order on an unwilling Europe, a Europe 
more interested in a security guarantee than in institutional innovation or political 
integration. Now Europe, through the EU and the manner in which it developed its 
CSDP, serves as an example of multilateral success in a countervailing inversion of 
ideologies. “Since the election of George W. Bush, which coincided with the birth of 
ESDP, the USA has tended to prioritize military instruments over diplomatic, unilateral 
approaches over multilateral, war-fighting over nation-building, and ad hoc coalition 
forming over Alliance nurturing. The EU, for its part, has done pretty much the 
opposite.”140  The United States is not as strong of a proponent of multilateralism as it 
once was, and Europe is multilateralism’s biggest advocate.  
The EU and its CSDP represent European intergovernmental coordination of a 
higher level than ever before attained. Although CSDP is still in its infancy and pales in 
comparison to NATO in its level of military integration, in conjunction with the other 
pillars of EU supra-nationality, it serves as a strong symbol of multilateralism in the 
contemporary strategic landscape. CSDP proves that the EU is not merely a regional 
economic organization. Rather, it is a step forward in exclusive European political 
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cooperation, which is multilateral in form. Towards the future, and involving the 
emerging powers, which are not Western in orientation, what can be expected regarding 
multilateralism as an organizing principle in international politics? Will multilateralism 
be useful? Will other powerful states see the utility?  
The previous investigation into multilateralism provided a strong sense of its 
place in Western security development since 1949. The specific cases that will be 
examined in light of such investigation are the decision making that took place at the UN 
Security Council and NATO regarding Libya in 2011. However, first a future conception 
of the place for multilateralism and its relationship to emerging powers is necessary. 
Despite NATO being an exclusively Western organization, the UN Security Council 
represents the UN, which is composed of most nations in the world and incorporates two 
Eastern permanent members, China and Russia, as well as multiple non-permanent 
members which are materially different in their worldview than the United States or 
Europe. 
H. MULTILATERALISM AND INTERPOLARITY 
 Two fundamental and lasting influences affecting the international system in the 
contemporary time period were established by Giovanni Grevi in a paper he wrote called, 
“The Interpolar World: A New Scenario.”141 He claims that the redistribution of power at 
the global level is leading to a new form of multipolarity, and that increasing 
interdependence is affecting the prosperity and security of large powers and thus the 
broader international community.142 We know this interdependence in the economic 
realm as the term “globalization.” Grevi contends that the convergence of these two 
forces will enable a condition he calls, “interpolarity.”  
Interpolarity is multipolarity in the age of interdependence. Interpolarity 
reflects the shifting balance of power and the ensuing geopolitical tensions 
while highlighting the fact that the prosperity and security of all the major 
powers are interconnected as never before…it suggests a set of guidelines 
for the reform of global governance structures, based on the respective 
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interests of the main global and regional powers and on the potential for 
their convergence around concrete policy issues…Interpolarity is interest-
based, problem-driven, and process-oriented, as it focuses on the 
frameworks and procedures that could help bring about cooperative 
solutions to shared challenges.143 
Interpolarity, as a concept in the idealized form espoused by Grevi, embodies 
many of the components of multilateralism, as multilateralism was defined by Keohane, 
Ruggie, and others. Interpolarity is another form of multilateral cooperation, but mainly 
among the “poles” of a multi/inter polar system. Its similarities include the conception of 
states working together to solve common problems in the international system. However, 
it also includes the aspect of interdependence, which will affect interstate relations for an 
indefinite period of time in the future.  
How will interdependence, interpolarity, and changing global power distributions 
be affected when the major emerging powers possess significantly differing worldviews 
than the Western powers did over the last 60 years? If multilateralism has been 
challenged among the United States and Europe, how will it operate between the United 
States, Europe, China, India, and Brazil? Grevi states that the coherence between Western 
discourse and practice will be much more closely scrutinized.144 Double standards 
undermine the Western normative strategy. The United States and Europe will be less 
able to escape pointed reminders of their own behavior when seeking to enjoin others to 
respect basic norms and principles of good political and economic governance.145 The 
point is “not to abandon a transformative agenda aimed at expanding the rule of law, 
human rights and democracy but to pursue it with less rhetoric and more consistency.”146 
In other words, the Western world had better start practicing what it preaches consistently 
or it will lose its normative high ground, fail in the promotion of its underlying values to  
 
 
                                                 
143 Grevi, “The Interpolar,” 9. 
144 Grevi, “The Interpolar,” 30.  
145 Grevi, “The Interpolar,” 30. 
146 Grevi, “The Interpolar,” 30. 
 41
rising Eastern societies, and experience a decline in its legitimacy among world opinion. 
Grevi embraces multilateralism as the organizing principle to achieve cooperation among 
increasing international players in a new and changing world.  
Multilateralism, in its current form, has been a force in international statecraft 
since the 1940s. It was originally used to form the institutions on which the world would 
rely for peace and security in the new strategic landscape following WWII. The United 
Nations and NATO specifically, were created with the ends of multilateralism—as 
defined and explained in the previous chapter—the engagement by world powers, 
member states, alliance partners, and other heads of state with each other in institutional 
forums that operated under generalized and expected principles of conduct. No decision 
making mechanism is ideal in every case. Interest, especially national interest, and 
calculations of power and influence, as well as phenomenon such as burden-shifting, 
inter-alliance partner competition, and conceptions of bargaining have intervened in the 
practice of multilateralism by state actors. The history of its implementation has been far 
from ideal, however it has remained a critical tenet upon which state interactions with 
each other have relied in a great many circumstances that have mattered since the late 
1940s. With this foundational and historic basis in multilateralism as an organizing 
principle of state interactions, the investigation of its application in decision making in 
the Libyan case begins, first with the UN Security Council and then with NATO. 
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III. DECISION MAKING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
A. RESOLUTION 1973 
 On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
1973 (2011). It invoked Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and authorized 
member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas, establish a no fly zone, and enforce an arms embargo. It also increased the scope of 
Libyan government financial assets to be frozen by the member states in which they are 
located.147 Chapter VII of the UN Charter includes Articles 39 through 51, and is entitled 
“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression.”148 Article 39 states that “The Security Council shall determine any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures are to be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”149 Article 41 authorizes the Security Council 
to call on member states to apply measures not involving the use of armed force, such as 
interruption of economic relations.150 Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to call 
on air, sea, or land forces to conduct operations to restore international peace and security 
if it deems the measures in Article 41 would be ineffective.151 Despite the language of 
“all necessary measures,” UN Security Council Resolution 1973 required the 
coordination of activities to be conducted with the UN Secretary-General, and prohibited 




                                                 
147 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), March 17, 2011. 
148 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII. 
149 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39. 
150 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 41. 
151 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 42. 
152 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), March 17, 2011. 
 44
Resolution 1973 is that it is the first time that the UN Security Council has authorized the 
use of military force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning 
state.153  
 The background to this decision is well characterized by Alex Bellamy in two 
articles, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm,”154 and 
“The new politics of protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to 
protect.”155 The latter was co-authored with Paul D. Williams. These articles argue the 
decisive action on Libya by the UN Security Council was a landmark decision that 
culminated a series of important changes. In other words, the Libya decision was not 
made in a vacuum, or out of a context policy on humanitarian intervention as it has 
evolved in the last two decades. Rather, it was the natural result of a movement, the ideas 
surrounding the newfound doctrine of the “responsibility to protect,” which had been 
gathering support and increasing in scope since 1992.156  
B. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 The “responsibility to protect” is an emerging set of ideas as policy regarding the 
inherent obligation of governments and the international community at large to protect 
populations against mass atrocities. This set of ideas calls for a change in values and 
norms regarding several key pillars of the international system of states. A state’s 
sovereignty over its territory and people is no longer absolutely inviolable under this 
conception. In the eyes of the greater international community, a particular state’s 
sovereignty is now contingent on its ability to protect its population.157 The inherent 
responsibility of the international community to intervene in order to prevent mass 
atrocities, like the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994, encompasses a 
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requirement to act, on those that are capable of doing something. This newfound call to 
action for the purposes of humanitarian protection of populations necessitates an 
international institution, an organization such as the UN, to regulate and provide a 
community mandate for acceptable external intervention, potentially against the wishes 
of a functioning, but negligent or belligerent state authority. 
 The “responsibility to protect” was officially accepted by the UN General 
Assembly on September 15, 2005, in its adoption of the outcome document after the 2005 
World Summit.158 Point 138 of that document states that “each individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity…”159 and that the international community should assist states 
in this effort. It essentially outlines that states are responsible for the safety and security 
of their populations. Point 139 includes an additional and direct responsibility of the 
international community to protect populations exclusive of state governments. It 
empowers the international community to use peaceful, as well as other means through 
the Security Council to fulfill its responsibility of protecting populations from 
atrocities.160  
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, 
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.161  
 
                                                 
158 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 15, 2005, 1. 
159 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 15, 2005, 31. 
160 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 15, 2005, 31. 
161 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 15, 2005, 31. 
 46
The UN is prepared to authorize action through the Security Council in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities fail to protect their populations.162 
 Since 1999, the Security Council has regularly invoked Chapter VII to protect 
civilians. Authorizations for peace operations in Sierra Leone, Haiti, Burundi, Liberia, 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Ivory Coast all included the 
language to “use all necessary means” to protect civilians.163 Not only was the 
“responsibility to protect” unanimously supported by UN member states at the 2005 
World Summit,164 but it has been reaffirmed in two additional Security Council 
resolutions: 1674 (2006)165 and 1894 (2009)166, in a report of the UN Secretary General 
entitled “Implementing the responsibility to protect,”167 and in the establishment of a new 
joint office for R2P and the prevention of genocide.168  
Previous thinking on international organization incorporated tenets of absolute 
state sovereignty and territoriality established originally during the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648 in order to end the carnage of the wars of religion. In this evolution of the 
international system of the five leading states, the cabinets agreed to respect each other’s 
territory and population as long as a sovereign ruler governed them on a common basis of 
ideas and statecraft. This view of international system of states was strengthened until the 
Twentieth Century resulted in two catastrophic world wars that decimated Europe. The 
first attempt at collective security stood in the Covenant of the League of Nations, a 
failed experiment that led to catastrophes and the miscalculations that contributed to 
world war. The second attempt emerged as the United Nations as a forum for keeping the 
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peace amongst world powers in 1945.169 Article 1 of the UN Charter includes two 
precepts for its existence that have come into conflict: “to maintain international peace 
and security,” and “to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment 
of these common ends.”170  
The idea behind the UN was not to violate state sovereignty, which all members 
took as given, but rather to use an international organization to encourage clarity of state 
diplomacy and thereby prevent war among major powers, the world’s worst atrocity up to 
that point. Recent actions by states that lacked the capability to govern and prevent 
atrocities on their sovereign territory, or by leaders that lost a mandate to govern their 
own population and sought to put down rebellion with genocide, have brought the idea of 
state sovereignty and its territorial integrity into question as an inviolable organizing 
principle of the international system. Member states of the UN have recently supported 
international intervention to protect populations from atrocities. In order to reconcile the 
competing principles of maintaining international peace and security and harmonizing the 
actions of “nations,” the language of recent R2P doctrine incorporates a higher purpose 
for state government. If any government cannot or is unwilling to protect its people, other 
capable actors in the international community may violate that state’s national 
sovereignty in the effort to fulfill their newfound obligation to protect civilian 
populations from atrocities.  
C. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The importance of this newfound justification for international intervention is that 
it has changed the debate within the Security Council from “questions about whether to 
act to protect civilians to questions about how to engage.”171 Has a multilateral consensus 
on the “responsibility to protect” been achieved? Are discussions of specific and 
particular national interests in relation to a proposed intervention subordinate to the  
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obligation to protect populations? Has R2P become the “commonly accepted frame of 
reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities?”172 Or, prior to Libya, was it 
a hollow, catchy slogan without a major humanitarian intervention to its credit.173 
An interesting phenomenon resulted from the progression of interest and 
adherence to R2P. Once states agreed that a government’s main responsibility is the 
security of its population in principle, and they also agreed on international cooperation 
to prevent mass atrocities when governments fail, they left little political room to 
maneuver. Now, when a case is presented with overwhelming evidence of an impending 
atrocity, states cannot hide from intervention behind the idea that their intervention would 
violate the offending state’s sovereignty. If a state doesn’t agree that an external 
intervention to prevent an atrocity is in its own interest, it must argue on another point. 
States have already agreed to the “responsibility to protect” in principle. Thus, it has 
become an accepted frame of reference for state conduct and adherence is expected in 
multilateral forums by other members and by the public at large.  
Authoritarian states may fear that too much support for external intervention 
could lead to a similar action in their own countries in the future. But, to argue against the 
action they must shift the debate to argue about the potentially unwelcome effects of 
action, the timing of action, the type of action, etc. and not focus on whether the action 
itself is warranted. By their previous admission, they exhibit moral opposition to the 
killing of populations. However, they may be concerned with the consequences of an 
international intervention for the future strategic landscape, and interpret it as against 
their national interest. Either way, because they agree with the principle underlying the 
doctrine, they are constrained in their opposition.  
 Although the movement behind R2P began under the premise that states would 
desire help, it recently expanded to involve actions without the approval of the host 
nation authority. In fact, the case of a regime being the offender, the instigator of mass 
atrocities against its own people, was the central premise that made the decision on Libya 
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so different than the decisions invoking similar principles that came before, such as those 
in Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, both of which took place to ease the situation 
after a humanitarian crisis had largely already occurred. In the former case, the decision 
to intervene by the UN was in the absence of a central government, and in the latter it 
was with the consent of the interim government.174 These cases differ from Libya in 
timing, lack of central government opposition, in the lack of established international 
embracement of ideas surrounding the “responsibility to protect,” and in the willingness 
of international actors to involve themselves in crisis actions outside the periphery of 
great power realms of influence. The cases in Somalia and Rwanda came only a few 
years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the post-Cold War era, a time 
of great uncertainty for the implications of international interventions. 
How can the Security Council vote on Libya in the year 2011 be interpreted given 
this logic? What do the public statements by voting members say about their interests, 
beliefs, and willingness to put words into action? What other factors influenced the vote 
in this particular case? The Security Council is made up of five permanent members: 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These members have 
a veto option on any non-procedural proposal. What this means is that any proposal for 
UN Security Council authorization of the use of force can be stopped by any one of the 
five. The UN General Assembly elects the other ten members for a period of two years.  
Decisions of the Security Council on all non-procedural items, i.e. those that 
matter, shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members. It takes nine votes and no opposition by any one of the 
five permanent members to pass any proposal. Under this system, the Security Council 
serves as the representative body of all member states, making recommendations for 
world security, the prevention of war, and the maintenance of peace. State size, military 
strength, national interest and the potential for state-sanctioned use of force cannot be 
hidden as primary requirements for permanent members.  
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The Security Council has no constitution or guiding document that provides 
constraints and boundaries for its decision making, except the broad procedural guidance 
in the UN Charter. Its principles revolve primarily around the security interests of its five 
permanent members and secondarily around ideas of generalized principles of conduct 
such as the “responsibility to protect.”175 However, these ideas are not binding. They 
only serve to influence because states can be held to public scrutiny when verbally 
supported principles do not match their actions. Regardless, the influence of peer 
acceptance and public scrutiny can be effective guideposts for freedom of maneuver in 
multilateral forums. Consistency is a highly sought after and rewarded characteristic for 
all participants. Without it, member states risk their credibility and future effectiveness on 
issues that may be more important.  
The five permanent members have an overwhelming influence, as they would if 
they existed in the anarchic international system of realist theorists’ conception without 
any organizing body. However, ten non-permanent members represent the rest of the UN 
General Assembly and procedurally serve to buffer the interests of the five powers 
through the requirement to have nine affirmative votes. Although all of the five 
permanent members have the capability to operate without UN Security Council 
authorization, they risk domestic disapproval, alienation, economic sanctions, and a 
general loss of influence on the world’s stage without it. Despite the peculiar arrangement 
of influence in the Security Council, the EU, NATO, and most states, at most times, 
regard the Security Council as the accepted forum for international legitimation of any 
“use of force” decisions besides self-defense. The UN Security Council is the sole 
accepted authorizer of non-self-defense “use of force” actions that concern other states, 
especially any of the five permanent members. The UN Security Council is thus the most 
accepted legitimating body for R2P, although it must call on other organizations to act 
under its authorization. 
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D. SPECIFICS OF THE LIBYA CASE 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states and 
coalitions to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in 
Libya on March 17, 2011. The vote was ten in favor, with five abstentions (Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, and Russia.) Resolution 1973 came less than three weeks after 
Resolution 1970,176 on February 26, 2011, which was unanimous, and reflected many of 
the same sentiments, but did not include the authorization for the use of force. The 
Security Council was presented with evidence of widespread and systematic attacks by 
the Libyan government against demonstrators and the surrounding civilian population. 
Resolution 1970 condemned the violence, called on the Libyan government to stop it, and 
instituted an arms embargo, a travel ban for selected members of the Gaddafi regime, and 
an asset freeze. No member of the Security Council opposed the resolution. After almost 
three weeks of continued violence, overt public declaration by Gaddafi to kill his own 
people, substantial evidence of human rights violations, and the impending attack on 
cities by massed troops positioned just outside, five members of the Security Council 
opposed the use of external force to prevent the imminent atrocity by abstaining on the 
vote for Resolution 1973. 
Two factors are especially significant: who opposed it, and what they said 
regarding their opposition. In this case, abstaining from the vote reflected the nature of 
the opposition of the five members. They opposed aspects of the resolution, but not 
entirely. Such opposition would have been inconsistent with their previous advocacy and 
support of the principle of R2P. They opposed action against the Libyan regime enough 
to make the point of their opposition known in a formal abstention. However, they did 
not want to carry the responsibility of having prevented action by others to stop the 
atrocity. In a way, that could have singled them out as being responsible for the atrocity, 
were it to occur. Political maneuvering was enabled by the structure of the Security 
Council, the ability to abstain, and the ability to voice concerns. As a result, effective 
authorization was not hindered and a mandate for action was achieved that reflected the 
actual politics of the Security Council on this topic.  
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The abstainers explained their votes in a Security Council Press Release. India 
was concerned that it did not have clear information back yet from a Secretary-General 
envoy to Libya. India drew attention to a lack of certainty regarding who would enforce 
the measures.177  
Brazil stated that its opposition wasn’t meant to “condone the behavior of the 
Libyan authorities or in disregard for the need to protect civilians.”178 However, Brazil 
was not convinced that the use of force would lead to the common objective—the 
immediate end of violence and the protection of civilians. Brazil was also concerned that 
the measure approved in Resolution 1973 could have the unintended effect of 
exacerbating the current tensions and causing more harm than good to the very same 
civilians they were committed to protect.179  
Russia expressed concern that its questions remained unanswered. Russia was 
especially concerned with who would conduct the action and what the limits of the 
engagement would be. Russia was keen to state that, although it had some disagreement 
about the best means to the same end, i.e. a ceasefire versus direct action, it was not 
preventing the adoption of the resolution.180  
China stated its longstanding opposition to the use of force when all peaceful 
means had not yet been attempted. It also had specific questions that were not answered. 
China also pointed out that it had not blocked the passage of the resolution because it 
attached great importance to the requests of the Arab League and the African Union.181  
Germany voiced concern about the likelihood of large-scale loss of life if military 
action ensued, and stated that participants might be drawn into a protracted military 
conflict that would expand into the region. In keeping with a restrained foreign policy 
beyond the borders of Europe as concerns force of arms, Germany would not support the 
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resolution, or contribute its own forces to any military effort that resulted from its 
implementation. Germany also did not oppose the resolution with a negative vote, which 
would have served as a trademark of its opposition. Instead Germany abstained.182  
Brazil expressed the most articulate and purposeful opposition, although it was 
not confident enough in its position to vote against the resolution. It likely did not want to 
suffer the consequence of recrimination were the action deemed a success. Abstaining 
allows a non-permanent member to voice opposition, but not risk being marked as the 
sole state preventing action. It also allows for some wiggle room, between previously 
expressed support for R2P and opposition in this particular case, at least at the time of the 
vote and in the manner proposed.  
China and Russia have expressed consistent opposition to Western-inspired 
interventions when it comes time for action despite previously expressed support for R2P 
in principle. R2P has made it harder to say “no,” without justification.183 These two 
countries moved the debate regarding Libya from a question of whether there was a 
“responsibility to protect” to a question of means. In that capacity, they were able to 
oppose the resolution for the lack of precise prescription and the failure to try everything 
else first. They did not want to support the resolution, yet they did not want to be seen as 
roadblocks to its implementation either. They did not want to be viewed as complicit in 
the deaths of large numbers of civilians, were that to occur because the Security Council 
failed to act because of their votes. Both authoritarian powers already have enough public 
opinion challenges regarding human rights in general. They operate as influential but 
contrary permanent members who understand the effects of their votes and their 
advocacy. They are careful not to be seen as being too helpful to the west. They reserve 
being overly pragmatic for their primary interests.  In either case, the public images of 
Russia and China would not have been helped by any sense of direct responsibility for 
another humanitarian disaster.  
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Germany presents the most striking complication: a country with international 
aspirations, the economic backbone of Europe, with talented leaders and a significant part 
of its political culture opposed to the use of force. Instead of aligning with its well-
advocated principles184 evident in the founding documents of the European Union and its 
newfound Common Foreign and Security Policy, Germany diverged from its French and 
British partners in an attempt to follow a special path to appease domestic political mood 
that is populist and pacifist. In an unexpected act of distancing itself from its long 
established allies, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Germany 
abstained. With a series of local elections coming soon in which the coalition government 
was buckling, economic interests in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) nations, and 
a general unwillingness to contribute troops that no longer exist, Germany was unable to 
maintain consistency of purpose and a sense of international responsibility in the face of 
selfish domestic interests.185 Germany’s aspirations to match international influence with 
its current economic might will likely be compromised by a statecraft of parochialism as 
well as under resources of military force as well as lack of solidarity with allies in the 
face of compelling humanitarian need.186  
On the whole, the actions of the abstainers and their statements reflect a few key 
observations. Permanent members of the Security Council are well aware of their 
responsibilities to their domestic populations, their fellow major powers, and the greater 
international community. Absent an overwhelming national interest or means to absorb 
the effects of singular responsibility for an imminent international atrocity, they were 
unwilling to stand in the way of those that were trying to help. Non-permanent abstainers 
had some justification for their opposition. However, none felt strongly enough to vote 
against the resolution. Regarding the cases of Brazil, China, and India, it is surmised that 
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such newly emerging powers have little interest in overthrowing the global system on 
which their prosperity was built.187 They are not being problematic towards the West 
without cause. It is as if they have mastered the rules of the game, and now Western 
thinking is changing one of the rules. They are understandably cautious. It is a success of 
the multilateral manner, i.e. the influence of generalized principles of conduct, that the 
debate did not rekindle arguments on the legitimacy of international community 
involvement in Libyan affairs under the established “responsibility to protect” doctrine. 
Rather, the debate revolved around whether military action would help or hurt the 
situation, a reasonable question.  
E. FOUR REMARKABLE FACTORS IN LIBYA 
What drove the supporters of intervention in Libya to support the resolution and 
to support it so quickly? Four factors have been identified which made the events leading 
up to Resolution 1973 remarkable.188 These factors—and the lack of effective opposition 
by the abstainers—fostered international consensus and motivated states to action. First, 
Muammar Gaddafi was internationally abhorred. He did not have many friends or 
business relations that made any nation want to protect his regime. Second, the threat of 
impending catastrophe was clear and evident. Gaddafi had personally promised it, his 
forces were positioned to inflict it, and they had been conducting smaller scale actions 
already. Third, important regional organizations such as the Arab League and the African 
Union were in support of the intervention. Fourth, the timeframe for action was short. As 
was learned from Rwanda in 1994, genocide can take place quickly, before the situation 
captures the attention of the world. Because of the short timeframe, members of the 
Security Council were forced to show their cards quickly.  
The structure of the UN Security Council offers an imperfect but not wholly 
inaccurate reflection of power and interest through its permanent membership by the 
world’s most influential states. Despite the peculiar nature of different classes of 
membership and the existence of ten non-permanent and rotational members, it was able 
                                                 
187 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO after Libya: the Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times,” Foreign 
Affairs, (Jul/Aug 2011), accessed Jan 26, 2011 at ProQuest. 
188 Bellamy and Williams, “New Politics of Protection,” 825. 
 56
to adopt Resolution 1973 in the Libyan case. Having the ability to discuss state interests 
and concerns prior to and after the votes in person, and in public press releases, and 
having options besides positive or negative votes helped to achieve enough consensus for 
a decision. The ability to record an abstention provides limited, but sufficient, political 
room for maneuver to allow for actions on divisive issues. The nuance of voting for or 
against an action, versus abstaining, is no small factor in international politics.189 When 
the ramifications of decisions have tremendous effects on the international standing of 
nations and the domestic standing of national leaders, nuance and political “wiggle room” 
become extremely important. The balance between this factor and a means to come to a 
decision, such as a minimum vote of nine affirmatives, was met in the Libyan case.  
The other factor that influenced this decision was the progressive buildup of 
international support, justification, and previous formal adoption of the “responsibility to 
protect.” It was the unanimous adherence to these principles that allowed the discussion 
on Libya to be about “how” and “when” versus “whether” or not R2P existed and 
intervention could occur. This material difference likely prevented outright opposition, or 
“no” votes based on the reluctance to violate national sovereignty. Lastly, the four 
straightforward characteristics present in the Libyan case that made it remarkable were 
the unpopularity of Gaddafi, the clear and evident threat, regional support, and the short 
timeframe for action. Without these characteristics motivating rapid action, it would have 
been tremendously more difficult, if not impossible, to justify intervention with a UN 
Security Council resolution. Because of the clear-cut nature of this case, the landmark 
decision to institute international R2P against the interests of an existing state was made. 
Only decades into the future will the outcome of the Libya case be determined. However, 
if a comparable case arose in the interim, the precedent established for Libya might assist 
to attain UN Security Council authorization and justification for external intervention 
more easily.  
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IV. DECISION MAKING IN NATO 
A. NATO RESPONSE 
 The violence in Libya imposed itself on NATO in early 2011. Reports that 
peaceful protests had resulted in overwhelming violence by the Gaddafi regime were met 
with calls to end the repression by NATO’s Secretary General.190 NATO seemed poised 
to act in crisis response just as soon as the UN Security Council approved authorization 
for military intervention. Instead, however, several allied and partner states met together 
in Paris and organized themselves as a “coalition of the willing” that did not start out 
under NATO auspices—all while a meeting of the NAC was postponed.191 Within a few 
hours of the completion of this meeting on March 19, 2011 military action commenced to 
protect civilian areas and enforce a no-fly zone over Libya.192 Why didn’t NATO 
members act under the flag of NATO command? What was it about the decision making 
process in NATO that contributed to this peculiar arrangement? The timeline of events, 
carefully crafted statements in press releases, and news reports that may contain leaked 
information yields some insight into the way the decision to command the operation in 
Libya eventually occurred. 
On February 21, 2011, the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
submitted a press release condemning the violence committed on civilian protestors by 
Libyan authorities and called for it to stop. He explained his position as a representative 
of an alliance of democracies, which believe that the will of a people cannot be 
ignored.193 On February 25, 2011 another press release stated the North Atlantic Council  
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had met and discussed the situation in Libya, and that the NAC believed the turmoil 
affected the safety and security of thousands of citizens, including some from NATO 
countries.  
B. NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
The North Atlantic Council is the senior political decision making body of NATO 
and acts more or less according to the consensus rule embodied in the Washington 
Treaty. The Council was established under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Each of 
the twenty-eight member nations who are party to the treaty, contribute a Permanent 
Representative to the NAC. These ambassadorial level members serve as the primary 
country representatives, although occasionally heads of state, government, or defense 
attend to represent their nations. The Secretary General runs meetings of the NAC, 
provides political guidance, and attempts to coordinate amongst the members. “Much of 
the leadership provided by NATO’s secretary general is exercised in closed-door sessions 
of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or in informal discussions in NATO’s hallways.”194  
 The North Atlantic Treaty, unlike the UN Charter, does not specify how decisions 
of the NAC are made, except in connection with membership. (Article 10 states that 
unanimous agreement is required to invite new states to join the alliance.)195 However, 
since its creation in 1949, NATO has developed a tradition of making decisions by 
consensus196—that is, general agreement among all members on positions or actions 
taken in the name of NATO.197 The consensus rule reflects NATO’s structure. It is an 
alliance of independent and sovereign countries, with a limited and specific legal 
personality of its own. It is not a supra-national body. NATO does not possess authority 
over its members. Rather, the reverse is true. “No Ally can be forced to approve a 
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position or take an action against its will.”198 Consensus is required for united action 
under NATO. This is especially important on politically sensitive issues, one of the most 
critical being the use of a country’s troops in combat. The structure of NATO is reflective 
of its original primary mission, a collective defense organization, composed of sovereign 
states. The strength of the alliance depends on cohesion and the maintenance of 
membership. Divisive issues, such as participation in small-scale contingencies are 
secondarily important to maintaining the goodwill and support of all allies for their 
collective defense.  
Typically NATO decisions are based on draft proposals, whether in one of the 
various committees or in the NAC. The Secretary General, the International Staff, and 
individual allies initiate draft proposals. “Written proposals generally are preceded in a 
variety of forums, including bilateral or multilateral discussions in allied capitals, allied 
missions at NATO Headquarters, the NAC, and committees and working groups 
established by the NAC.”199 Consultations consist of the socialization process of 
garnering support; identifying concerns or objections, and re-crafting proposals in 
mutually agreed on ways. The idea is to get buy-in and make the necessary adjustments 
before a proposal is brought up for a decision. After all, in a totally consensus decision 
making process, one objection can defeat a draft proposal.  
C. ACHIEVING CONSENSUS 
It is very difficult to examine the influence of the Secretary General, any country 
representative, or figure out how the alliance came to a decision because the written 
release of any NAC discussion requires approval of all member states, which normally 
takes thirty years. Press releases, statements, news reports, country actions, external 
influences, and the organizational structure and purpose offer the best clues to the 
decision making that may have taken place in the NAC. The Secretary General stands out 
as the strongest figure that facilitates the achievement of consensus in the NAC.200 Also, 
it is assisted by a decision making procedure in which he possesses the initiative.  
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The Secretary General has no power to vote or force any decision, however, he is 
empowered with the role of introducing proposals to be voted on and can choose to do so 
under a procedural mechanism called the “silence procedure.” In meetings of the NAC 
“the silence procedure is only exercised by the secretary general, but it is used with the 
backing of most states in the alliance.”201 Under the silence procedure the Secretary 
General circulates a draft proposal and if no ally breaks silence, i.e. makes its opposition 
known in writing before the deadline set by the Secretary General, the proposal is 
considered approved.202 If an ally does break silence, then it is referred back for further 
work in the attempt to achieve consensus. The use of this procedure biases decisions 
towards approval of the item under consideration. If the Secretary General circulates a 
draft proposal before a national position has been determined, members will likely not 
oppose the decision without considerable cause. Members do not want to be the sole 
obstructer to alliance action, nor to isolate themselves amongst their peers. Instead, they 
can do nothing and if later they determine they should have opposed the decision the case 
can be made to their publics that they did not support the decision.203 
NATO does not reveal to the public which member state broke silence, although 
national positions are often purposely made public in some way, i.e. leaked to the press, 
especially on contentious issues.204 The silence procedure forces a less enthusiastic ally 
to formally oppose the secretary general. If it were to be made public, although it is 
known in the NAC and amongst the twenty eight allies, dissenting opinions would cause 
two things: world knowledge of dissent at NATO reducing the perceived strength and 
unity of the alliance, and public knowledge of the particular spoiler within NATO.205 
Both are undesirable. Since there is no formal voting procedure, nor any requirement to 
explain positive, negative, or abstentions to the public, NATO either acts or it doesn’t. If 
it acts, it does so because it has achieved consensus. Any expressed opposition was not of 
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sufficient strength and willingness to risk public disclosure, prevent other allies from 
acting in the name of the alliance, or compromise in any material way the primary 
purpose of collective defense.  
In the effort to maintain alliance cohesion, a disagreeing member state makes its 
disagreement known privately. Such a member state may express an unwillingness to 
participate in an action, but most importantly doesn’t do or say anything under the silence 
procedure. This allows representatives political wiggle room. “The nuance between a 
decision making procedure that allows an ally to acquiesce in a collective decision 
(despite its public or private reservations) and a procedure that would oblige that state to 
cast a yea or nay vote in the NAC may appear…insignificant. In practice, the nuance 
matters enormously.”206 The silence procedure can serve to insulate representatives from 
their domestic critics. It contributes to the achievement of consensus by allowing for 
representatives to not have to explain their support for an item to dissenting voters at 
home.207 
D. LIBYA 
One day after the NAC met and publicly disclosed that it was monitoring the 
situation in Libya, February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1970. 
This first resolution stopped short of authorizing international military intervention. 208 
On March 8, NATO deployed AWACS aircraft to monitor any movements in Libyan 
airspace, i.e. Gaddafi air forces preparing to bomb civilians.209 On March 10, NATO 
defense ministers agreed to move alliance ships to the area to boost monitoring efforts.210 
On March 17, the UN Security Council met and passed Resolution 1973, authorizing 
member states and regional organizations to use all necessary means to protect civilians 
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and civilian areas, but prohibited occupation forces.211 On March 19, NATO 
ambassadors met to discuss involvement, but no decision was taken.212 “A NATO 
diplomat said Britain, the United States and Canada wanted NATO to take a lead in the 
operation but Paris was lukewarm on the idea.”213 "France seems to have some problem 
with it being a NATO operation, given NATO's reputation in the Arab world as a result 
of Afghanistan and given that NATO is seen as an alliance dominated by the United 
States," he said.214 Additionally, France was “determined to prove its diplomatic clout 
after its clumsy handling of the revolt in Tunisia,” and sought to lead a world response to 
the crisis in Libya.215  
Also on March 19, several world leaders met in Paris by invitation of the 
President of France, then Nicolas Sarkozy. This session was an attempt to achieve 
consensus for coordinated military intervention in Libya.216 A communiqué was 
published listing the attendees and stating the results of the conference: a determination 
to take military action consistent with Resolution 1973.217 This communiqué expressed 
the hopeful intentions of the attendees but did not obligate any to provide forces. Angela 
Merkel, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was in attendance, and we 
know from Germany’s vote on the UN Security Council, that the FRG was not in favor of 
sending troops to Libya. Hours after the meeting concluded, French warplanes, under a 
unified command structure led by the United States, struck targets in Libya.218 The U.S.  
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Department of Defense announced that “coalition forces launched ‘Operation Odyssey 
Dawn’ today [March 19] to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the 
Libyan people from the country’s ruler.”219  
For the next thirteen days, a series of pronouncements was made regarding 
NATO’s increasing level of participation. Under the name of the alliance, NATO began 
to assume command of more and more components of the operations over Libya. NATO 
itself slowly assumed command from the coalition of NATO member countries who 
participated in the initial strikes: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
with assistance from Italy, and in partnership with two non-NATO nations from the Arab 
world, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.  
On March 22, the NATO Secretary General announced “NATO has decided to 
launch an operation to enforce the arms embargo against Libya with NATO ships.”220 He 
also announced NATO had “completed plans to help enforce the no-fly zone—to bring 
our contribution, if needed, in a clearly defined manner to the broad international 
effort.”221 On March 23, the Secretary General announced that NATO Allies have now 
decided to take on enforcement of the no-fly zone over Libya.222 On March 24, he 
announced that “NATO Allies have now decided to enforce the no-fly zone,” and “all 
NATO Allies are committed to fulfill their obligations under the UN resolution. That is 
why we have decided to assume responsibility for the no-fly zone.”223 He also stated that 
there would be both a coalition operation and a NATO operation, but that NATO was 
considering whether it should take on a broader responsibility.224  
                                                 
219 Jim Garamone, “Coalition Launches ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn,’” American Forces Press Service, 
March 19, 2011, accessed February 23, 2012 at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63225. 
220 NATO, “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Libya arms embargo,” Press Release, 
March 22, 2011. 
221 NATO, “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Libya arms embargo,” Press Release, 
March 22, 2011. 
222 NATO, “NATO Secretary General’s statement on no-fly zone over Libya,” Press Release, March 
23, 2011. 
223 NATO, “NATO Secretary General's statement on Libya no-fly zone,” Press Release, March 24, 
2011. 
224 NATO, “NATO Secretary General's statement on Libya no-fly zone,” Press Release, March 24, 
2011. 
 64
As the spokesman for the organization, the Secretary General expressed the 
sentiments of the NAC in his daily press briefings. This new point was often difficult to 
articulate because of the initial lack of consensus among influential NATO members 
about whether NATO should lead the operation or be involved at all. Interestingly, the 
same member states agreed that the operation must take place, and instead formed an 
initial coalition outside the alliance. The process of achieving consensus to eventually 
lead the effort took place over two weeks and was outlined by the increasing level of 
responsibility for the operation that NATO was willing to take, made public by the 
Secretary General. 
On March 25, it was reported by sources from the United Kingdom and France 
that Western allies and Turkey had secured a deal to put the entire military campaign 
under NATO command by next week.225 This deal was expected to end the 
disagreements among allies, but needed consensus from the NAC. According to the 
previous day’s press release from the Secretary General, consensus had not yet occurred. 
It is surmised that those sources were reporting that the critical disagreeing participants: 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Turkey had come to an agreement, 
and that agreement within the NAC was expected.226 On March 27, the NATO Secretary 
General announced that NATO allies had decided to take on the whole military operation 
under Resolution 1973, and that NATO’s top operational commander was to begin 
executing this with immediate effect.227 On March 31, it was announced that NATO took 
sole command of international air operations over Libya. The operation was named 
Operation Unified Protector and included the arms embargo, no-fly zone, and actions to 
protect civilians and civilian population centers.228 
In a reprise of earlier issues connected with France and the Mediterranean as far 
back as the 1950s, NATO decision making was hindered by disagreement about who 
should command the operation. France wanted to play the star in this crisis response, and 
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did not want it to occur under the flag of NATO, with whom it has had a conflicted 
relationship. However, in 2009, France completed a step-by-step process whereby it re-
integrated itself into NATO’s military command, which it had more or less formally left 
in the late 1960s, but had approached again since the 1990s. France did not want the 
Libya action to be commanded by NATO.  
The United States was initially hesitant to lead another crisis response. The 
United States felt that Libya was in Europe’s backyard, therefore it was happy to allow 
Europe to assume the burden. Also, the United States did not want to be seen conducting 
another military operation in a Muslim country. The United Kingdom wanted the action 
conducted under NATO auspices. It wanted strong approval and participation by the 
United States, ensuring its “special relationship” and close alliance remained intact. 
Turkey, incensed with France for so many snubs on its national pride by President 
Sarkozy, and whose support was absolutely crucial—the West’s most important link with 
the Muslim world—demanded that the action come under a NATO flag.229 Germany, 
who abstained from the vote in the Security Council that passed Resolution 1973, 
maintained that it would not contribute troops. Germany continued to express support for 
its ally’s intentions of preventing mass atrocities, but was unwilling to support with 
action because of domestic politics as well as a shortage of deployable troops from 
chronic underfunding. Considering the rift between Turkey and France, as well as 
Germany’s vote in the Security Council, a consensus decision in a meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council on March 19 would have been unlikely. However, another avenue, an ad 
hoc meeting of national leaders without the strains of formal organization, provided the 
additional political flexibility to achieve the necessary support for united action. Thus, on 
March 19, a Communiqué calling for military action supported by the coalition of 
assembled states was released, and a few hours later French warplanes were over Libyan 
skies.230  
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E. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSENSUS 
As a result, the NATO alliance, the most capable and multilateral security 
organization with the most international legitimacy, was prevented from immediate 
action despite having a UN authorization for crisis response. The main criteria for 
international intervention under the “responsibility to protect” doctrine was met in the 
Libyan case: regional support for action was clear, the threat was indisputable, the 
timeframe to act was short, and an international mandate for action was present. 
Additionally, Gaddafi’s regime was internationally unpopular, with no major power 
willing to stand by it. As a result, there was no major obstacle standing in the way of 
NATO action besides its own multilateral consensus based decision making system as 
well as the imponderables of war amid the largest economic crisis since the 1930s. The 
proposed action was even considered “just” by a leading thinker on “just war” theory. 
Nigel Biggar presented the case that coalition action in Libya was just under 
international law by examining it against the agreed on tenets: just cause, right intention, 
competent authority, last resort, proportionality, jus in bello, and just peace.231 He 
concluded that under the “responsibility to protect” doctrine Gaddafi forfeited his right to 
non-intervention. The protection of civilians by the international community sufficed as 
just cause.232 Since the only evidence of motive for action was humanitarian, right 
intention existed, i.e. the interveners did not have designs on winning Libyan territory, 
resources, or other selfish motivations. The UN Security Council and Resolution 1973 
provided competent authority. The clear threat and lack of previous measures to deter 
Gaddafi met the condition of last resort. The principle of proportionality is met if the 
good achieved is thought to outweigh the harm that will likely arise from military action. 
A matter of belief, there was evidence to suggest that this was the case in Libya. Jus in 
bello is met if the conduct of operations complies with the principles of proportion and 
non-combatant immunity, which was the very raison d'être for the action, i.e. Gaddafi’s 
attack on non-combatants. Will the action result in a just peace is a difficult question to 
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answer and will depend more on the actions of the Libyan people afterwards than the 
military operation itself. If it is believed that the operation will enable Libyan self-
realization, then it can be considered to meet the principle in theory. Biggar concluded 
that although judgments of how well the action in Libya accorded with just war theory 
was subject to continual reassessment, the action was initially just.233  
Rarely is an international intervention supported as thoroughly as that in Libya. 
Russian and Chinese abstentions in the Security Council offer the strongest consent that 
can historically be expected from the authoritarian powers. There was a clear 
authorization from the UN Security Council. There were requests for action by regional 
organizations. A clear and incontrovertible threat, likely to result in imminent crimes 
against humanity, was made public by the pronouncements of Gaddafi himself. A recent 
history of formal adoption and verbal embracement of the doctrine of “responsibility to 
protect” justified the violation of a principle held dear for centuries, state sovereignty. 
There was no debate refuting that change in a previously strongly held sentiment. The 
new general principle of international intervention in such cases was argued only on other 
points. Additionally, by an expert account the intervention was judged to be “just” under 
the most stringent of principles of international law, an extremely difficult measure to 
meet.  
Despite these favorable conditions, and probably much the result of the war 
weariness from the Afghan campaign, continued action in Kosovo, and the uncertainty 
which would have plagued a formal meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO was 
prevented from taking the initiative in the full organizational sense of its capacity for 
collective action. However, because the members of NATO through years of 
consultations, debate, working through divisiveness on issues such as Iraq, and because 
of innumerable diplomatic consensus building events in and alongside the NATO 
framework, were able to form an ad hoc coalition and meet in an alternative venue, that 
was supported by those involved. Despite disagreement about the ideal form of 
intervention, the decision was made to act quickly in the attempt to avoid a potential 
calamity like what occurred in Rwanda in 1994, and sort out the diplomacy and public 
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relations aspect of the campaign afterwards. This enabled rapid action and a symbolic 
lead by France who was interested in being in front, command and control by the United 
States, the most capable and ready actor with comprehensive military resources but a 
conflicted position on wanting to lead the conflict. The United States desired to avoid 
being seen as the instigator of action, was happy to give up the limelight, and looked for 
an early exit of its involvement, happy to shift the burden to NATO as soon as it was 
politically feasible.234 Although other influential actors desired the action to be 
conducted under the auspices of NATO, they were more interested in it happening before 
any responsibility could be placed on capable actors for not acting, if large-scale loss of 
civilian life occurred. In the positive sense, NATO, facilitated this action by its members 
and partners through its history as a multilateral forum for consultations. On the contrary, 
it was not prepared for action in the name of its organization because its decision making 
process favored inaction until all members could reach consensus. The positive viewpoint 
expresses the idea that NATO is a force for the promotion of its principles of 
“democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”235 as much as it is an organization 
ready to conduct enforcement actions in its name, that serve to justify its existence as a 
international security actor.  
A coalition of the willing and the capable conducted the initial actions. It took two 
weeks for the decision making process at NATO to catch up, despite the fact that the 
same actors were playing multiple roles. National leaders, because of the disagreements 
previously enumerated and a lack of desire to coordinate within the NAC, found it easier 
to coordinate a military action outside of the NATO alliance.  
What are the implications of such a decision making process? It doesn’t stop 
action by member states coordinating together in “coalitions of the willing” outside 
NATO. How does this affect the alliance? First, it supports the structure of NATO as it 
currently exists, a body of sovereign states aligned with the primary purpose of providing 
for the common defense. Consensus based decision making may yield slow results. It 
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may prevent rapid action by the alliance in crisis response operations. It may cause strife 
between members because of disagreements on matters that are not central to the purpose 
of the alliance. However, consensus based decision making in NATO, with the 
assistance, guidance, and leadership exhibited by the Secretary General, can ensure that 
when the alliance makes a decision, it is supported in principle by all members, even if all 
do not participate. The strategic implications of this decision making process serve to 
strengthen the alliance for its primary purpose, collective defense, even though it may 
compromise crisis response.  
Were NATO to have a decision making procedure that forced a vote, a public  
admission of each nation’s stance, or a process akin to the European Union’s qualified 
majority rule, it would likely have seen a different result. Members would have been 
constrained by domestic political consideration in the effort to reach a decision. Germany 
likely would have abstained, or even voted against the Libyan action. France definitely 
would have opposed, and then found it harder to change its position once it had cast a 
vote. Even if it passed, a tally of the votes would demonstrate that NATO was a divided 
organization. It might, or might not obligate non-consenting members to participate. Such 
obligation would be a violation of the sovereignty NATO attempts to defend. Such a 
decision making procedure might serve to force a vote, or force collective action on a 
crisis response operation that all members did not support. It would surely cause division 
and weaken a pillar of the foundation of the alliance, the institution, the collective 
capacity to resist armed aggression by working together, and the faith in mutual fidelity 
to Article 5. A consensus based decision making mechanism is the correct means for 
members of NATO to come together on issues which involve the use of force. 
The consensus based decision making procedure was viewed as a procedural 
problem in the hundreds of committees subordinate to the NAC by previous Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe from 2003 to 2006, General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired. 
However, it was viewed as the appropriate decision making mechanism in the North 
Atlantic Council. General Jones stated that the alliance’s decision making needed to be 
more agile. “The 350 committees in NATO behave as if they see themselves as mini-
NACs—little versions of the North Atlantic Council that much operate on the same 
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consensus system as the NAC itself. That means that slow and painful lowest-common-
denominator decision making prevails.”236 General Jones suggests that the consensus rule 
has been stretched too far. There are too many committees, which are too slow to act, and 
which have been endowed with too much decision making prerogative by the NAC. 
General Jones does not criticize or comment on the ineffectiveness of the consensus rule 
in the NAC. Political decision making, at the highest level for the alliance is bound by its 
membership of sovereign states. Decision making in this type of forum must incorporate 
room for political maneuver in order to account for the compromise necessary to create 
cohesion among disparate interests. Additionally, the conflict between the primacy of 
domestic political concerns of member state democracies whose leaders are in power by 
virtue of the will of their populations contrasts with the organizational requirement for 
relevancy embodied in decisive crisis action on international security dilemmas—which 
may or may not threaten the perception of security in member states. 
Consensus takes time to build. Minds occasionally have to be changed. Interests 
sometimes have to be explained. Disagreements have to be mitigated. These things take 
time, especially when so much is at stake. The time involved in achieving consensus 
among twenty-eight member states does not present a challenge to NATO’s relevance in 
crisis action responses, since innumerable other options are available to its member 
states. Nor is timeliness a reason to change the decision making rule which has kept the 
alliance united for so long. Rather, the multilateral discussion and debate that leads to 
consensus strengthens the solidarity and expected conduct of members and partners. 
NATO’s multilateral decision making process based on consensus is part of the 
character of the organization that derives from the values of its democratic political 
cultures in their variety. In NATO’s fight for continued relevance in a changing world, 
against those that would argue its cost exceeds its benefit—in light of the post-Cold War 
strategic landscape, i.e. no threatening Soviet expansionism or Warsaw Pact 
organization—NATO has found a difficult role as the crisis response arm of western 
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democracies in ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. When NATO reaches 
consensus among its twenty-eight member states and has the backing of a UN Security 
Council authorization, it is clearly the most capable and appropriate security actor in the 
world. However, the dynamic interaction of member states in NATO’s decision making 
process takes time and will likely slow NATO from immediate action. Generalized, 
expected, and consistent principles of conduct will guide NATO’s decision making 
process, as previous acceptance of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine assisted its 
eventual consensus on armed intervention in Libya. However, the burden sharing of state 
involvement in operations, perceptions of the effectiveness of military intervention, and 
national domestic political concerns will require time to vet, mitigate, and overcome. 
Previously accepted principles of conduct that have been derived and upheld in 
multilateral forums and actual operations, will provide the best foresight and guidance for 
quicker future decision responses by the alliance.    
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V. CONCLUSION 
NATO ended its military action in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, on 
October 31, 2011.237 In the NATO press release of October 28, 2011 announcing this 
update, NATO’s Secretary General stated that NATO launched this complex operation 
faster than ever, complied with the mandate of the United Nations to protect the people of 
Libya, and was standing by to assist if called on again.238 The operation may have 
marked a land-speed record for NATO, but it wasn’t launched as fast as the coalition of 
willing NATO members and partners that began operations almost two weeks before 
NATO assumed command. The timeline of press releases evidenced and the sequence of 
announcements tells the story of NATO’s decision making process much differently than 
the summaries of NATO actions completed after the fact. Summaries and later 
announcements appear to make the case that it was a NATO action all along. In fact, it 
was not, and there was good reason for it—the NATO decision making process had not 
yet resulted in consensus.  
By the definitions provided in the Chapter I, NATO and the United Nations are 
multilateral organizations. They are both are multilateral in form, coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states and adhering to certain principles of ordering 
relations among member states and the international community.239 The key component 
of multilateralism that qualitatively differentiates it from other forms of international 
relations is not evident merely in the numbers of states involved, but rather by fidelity to 
generalized principles of expected and consistent conduct that all parties have agreed 
apply universally and are unrelated to the particular or strategic interests of any particular 
member for any particular case.240  
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The UN is a multilateral collective security organization with representation by 
almost all states in the world. Despite its decision making mechanism that subjects any 
significant security decision to veto by any of the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, it is guided by generalized principles of conduct. Ideas about 
appropriate state behavior in the contemporary strategic landscape mitigate the balance-
of-power, interest-based framework on which UN Security Council membership and 
voting relies. Avoiding significant conflict between the great powers and preventing 
world war is the most important objective of the UN Security Council and the aim for 
which it was designed.241 Nevertheless, the public and multilateral forum in which 
decisions are debated is influenced by generalized principles of conduct.  
NATO is based on two multilateral principles: the indivisibility of threats to the 
collectivity, and the requirement of an unconditional collective response.242 The 
collective defense guarantee is the primary good provided by the alliance. Although it 
was originally designed to counter a specific threat, the defense guarantee remains highly 
valued by members and sought after by potential members and partners. The consensus 
based decision making tradition that has provided alliance cohesion over the last 60 years 
and several turbulent periods is unlikely to be sacrificed in the name of more effective 
crisis response, no matter how strong the perceived need to prove relevancy in a dynamic 
international system. NATO includes three of the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council and operates under many of the same principles of conduct that guide 
state behavior in the international arena.  
The decision making process in the UN Security Council and in NATO is similar 
in many respects. Both are multilateral. Both are influenced by the discussion and debate 
of other members, as well as by the vetting of particular state interests which may be 
different than those assumed. Both are subject to a delayed understanding of issues by 
their populations before the cycle of news and domestic debate catches up with 
international requirements. Members of both organizations are often constrained to 
articulate their position before national support can be gauged. Member positions on 
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issues in both organizations are subject to the scrutiny and criticism of other members. 
Because of this dynamic, consistency and predictability are highly valued. Members that 
regularly take positions contrary to previous positions will have a difficult time 
explaining their perspective and will not be taken seriously. Benefits from interstate 
cooperation are based on a sense of trust and reliability between the states. Thus, 
members of both organizations are subject to the conforming pressure of adhering to 
previously articulated positions. This phenomenon is one of the characteristics that result 
in multilateral relations being characterized by generalized principles of conduct. If 
interest were the dominating construct, then positions could fluctuate from case to case as 
state interests changed. However, it is a requirement of the multilateral forum that states 
divulge the principles to which they agree in advance and without any particular case as 
an example. When a case arises, their position will be constrained to conform to their 
previous commitment. Related issues can still be argued, but general agreement on 
important principles is ensured. Because of this, everything is not up for continual debate 
and a point of agreement forms the basis for working together on common solutions. 
Both NATO and the UN Security Council are influenced by this multilateral 
characteristic.  
Decision making in the UN Security Council differs from that in NATO in many 
significant dimensions. The character of membership is one dimension. Another is the 
public versus private nature of debate. A third is the difference in result. In cases before 
the UN Security Council, the item up for decision is usually an authorization for action 
by others. It is essentially great power permission to act with force in the international 
system. In cases before the NAC, the result of decision is often action itself. Action costs, 
authorization does not. Action results in a burden and a sense of direct responsibility. 
Authorization results in a political position that constrains future action, but does not 
necessarily result in any physical requirement. This difference in scope and type of 
responsibility is significant for potential future burdens of action. 
Another difference is substitution. There is no substitute for UN Security Council 
authorization. It is the generally accepted body to legitimate international intervention. 
Without a UN Security Council resolution, states that interfere in the sovereign domain of 
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other states, besides in a straightforward self-defense action, are isolated against world 
opinion. They feel the brunt of the burden of explaining their actions with little or no 
support, and they face significant obstacles to explain that their position may not have 
been legitimate, but it was right.  
On the contrary, if NATO fails to approve an action, there are innumerable 
substitute courses of action available. Any unilateral action, or coalition of the willing, 
even of NATO members, will suffice to conduct a crisis response. Although, perhaps not 
the most desired organization of forces, coalitions provide the means to act without 
directly threatening alliance cohesion. As a result, it is known during the decision making 
process that there are ways of accomplishing the same mission if all members cannot 
come to a consensus. This makes the nature of debate in NATO different than that in the 
UN Security Council.  
There are two classes of membership in the UN Security Council. Threat of veto 
by permanent members, i.e. the so-called great powers, significantly affects the voting 
process. This unequal membership composition reflects more accurately the possession 
of power in the international system than a representative scheme designed to treat all 
states the same. The NAC is composed of supposedly equal state representatives, but a 
few states also have seats on the UN Security Council, some possess a nuclear capability, 
and one wields the influence of overwhelming conventional expeditionary power 
projection anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, the decision making process relies on 
equal formal representation and the attainment of consensus by all members for action to 
proceed. However, to assist consensus, a procedural rule is used to influence otherwise 
indecisive members to conform. Both UN Security Council and NATO formalized 
decision making processes are affected by behind the scenes deals, overt and clandestine 
debate, as well as strategic calculations of other member positions. However, the same is 
true of junior high school dating and politics in general. Nevertheless, the differences in 
membership affect the different decision making processes. 
The significant similarity in both is the accommodation of political space in which 
member states can maneuver. Such nuances may appear trivial, but as national 
governments try to navigate the chasm between the diplomatic relations to reach 
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international agreement and the requirement to appease fluctuating domestic audiences, 
every little bit counts. The allowance for abstentions in UN Security Council votes and 
the lack of formal voting in the NAC, both of which result in members able to say that 
they did not support an action effectively has the same result. They both contribute to the 
attainment of agreement by allowing for a little “wiggle room.” Some states may not 
desire a particular action, yet they may not necessarily oppose it either, especially if they 
are not required to participate. They may be more interested in the benefit of solidarity 
than the consequence of divisiveness if they do not have a strong opinion on the 
particular case. In other words, they may allow others to act if it does not affect them 
negatively.   
The private nature of debate in the NAC prevents close scrutiny. It also results in 
indirect methods of determining state positions by those that are not privy to the 
discussion. In some circumstances this may help those that change their positions in the 
maintenance of alliance cohesion to keep a sense of consistency not afforded to those 
whose positions are made public immediately, such as in the UN Security Council. For 
example, France clearly changed its tune sometime after the initial stages of the Libyan 
operation. The impetus that provoked this turnabout is unknown. Also, the debate 
regarding the initial decisions by the coalition of the willing is not available. As a result, 
France is saved some public scrutiny of its potential inconsistency. The public does not 
know the reason behind either of its positions and thus cannot judge their respective 
merits. Were this to be the case in the UN Security Council, all decisions would be public 
from the start, and France may have felt increased pressure to conform with its original 
position even if circumstances had changed considerably. A turnabout in a public forum 
requires justification that can be understood universally, or a decline in international 
standing will result. Germany is such a participant in this regard. It abstained in the UN 
Security Council and then supported the action at the NAC, if by no other means than by 
not opposing it. Regardless, Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council, a public 
forum, has resulted in considerable criticism of its position and no doubt affected its 
relations with other states. Public forums are affected differently than private ones. They 
require a greater consistency of adherence to principles and values. 
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What contributed to international action in Libya? How were two different 
organizations able to come to a decision that action was warranted? Quite simply, three 
factors stand out. The first factor is the significant effect of the multilateral nature of the 
decision making processes in both the UN Security Council and in NATO. Although 
different in form, nature, and purpose, both are guided by the material characteristic that 
defines multilateralism and qualitatively differentiates it from other forms of organizing 
international relations: adherence to generalized principles of expected conduct. Such 
behavior is generated and reinforced by the organizations and institutions that conduct 
affairs in groups of three or more states, and which have an open forum for debate, at 
least amongst members.  
The second factor is the recent international movement and formalized support for 
the overarching principle of the “responsibility to protect.” Without such public 
declaration of support for a principle that dramatically altered a basic notion of 
international relations in existence for over three hundred years, it is unlikely that 
authorization for action in Libya would have been granted. Instead, a debate on the 
benefits and consequences of violating state sovereignty would likely have interfered 
with action in any particular case. However, since states were able to come to agreement 
on the principle in advance, with no specific state interest at stake, the general adherence 
served to provide a point of agreement that influenced the later debate. This was 
evidenced by the nature of argument in the UN Security Council by those that abstained. 
Their argument focused on the effectiveness of action, whether it would help or hurt the 
situation, if the timing was right, and which organization should intervene. The argument 
did not revolve around whether it was acceptable to violate Libya’s sovereignty to 
prevent atrocity. Already established and agreed on was the principle that a state’s 
government was responsible for the protection of its civilian population. If unable, or 
unwilling, the international community also had a “responsibility to protect” that 
population in order to prevent atrocity.  
The third factor involves the four driving characteristics that were particular to the 
case in Libya in 2011. The international unpopularity and isolation of the Gaddafi regime 
left it without any support amongst the international community. The clear and credible 
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threat on the population made by Gaddafi himself, and backed up by the positioning of 
troops, armor, and existing small-scale violence on civilian areas was indisputable. 
Regional support from important organizations and neighboring states called for a crisis 
response and requested military action to intervene. Lastly, the short timeframe for action 
forced a decision, or the international community might suffer another catastrophe like 
Rwanda in 1994, where it took too long to recognize what was occurring and decide on a 
course of action. Because of these four unique circumstances, decisive action was 
possible in Libya.  
The question remains of how effective multilateral decision making processes 
were in these organizations in this particular case. There is no standard amongst national 
actors, international organizations, or others in the realm of decisions to go to war, 
decisions to avoid a particular conflict, or decisions to engage in a crisis action operation. 
Each decision has value because it upheld the existing principles, of which the parties to 
the decision claimed to hold dear prior to being called to act. Only decades into the future 
will an historic evaluation of the decision to intervene in Libya, opposed to other possible 
courses of action, be weighed against the consequences that are yet to occur. Enough time 
has not yet elapsed to historically evaluate the decision to intervene in Libya. As a result, 
the metric for evaluation is limited to a qualitative analysis of what can be known about 
the principles to which states party to the decisions, in each respective organization, 
espouse in verbal form or written agreement. In both organizations, the decision to act in 
Libya was made by the participants who were party to the decision. In the case of the UN 
Security Council, there were some abstentions, but even those actions were made in a 
calculating way so as to not prevent action by others. In the case of NATO, consensus, 
however achieved, was the driving force behind the organization’s action. Every member 
state agreed to allow action in the name of the alliance, whether it chose to contribute 
forces directly, indirectly behind the scenes, or did not participate at all. These decisions 
were also made with the caveats that reflect the politics of each organization that arise 
from the history and customs of the institution as well as the domestic politics and 
national interests of the allies and powers as well as the other myriad factors the affect 
statecraft.  
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In the UN Security Council, the membership of the non-permanent side reflected 
a unique conglomeration of states that reflect the state of the international system in the 
mid Twentieth century. In NATO, the decision to act was slowed by a disagreement 
among major members and by a substitute option. However, the argument presented in 
this paper suggests that the decision making processes reinforced the structure of each 
organization and their respective primary purposes. If successful, crisis response actions 
are desirable to provide stability and potentially stop small-scale problems from 
becoming regional or international conflicts. However, crisis response actions are not the 
raison d'être for either organization and entail significant use of policy with force and 
statecraft to achieve a limited end of policy.  
The UN and NATO play a significant role in the modern world despite their 
origins in the 1940s. Neither is ineffectual if it doesn’t make a correct and timely decision 
on a crisis action. Both organizations are part of the multilateral world order, created in 
the post-WWII landscape by the influence of the United States, and designed to prevent 
another world war. Although they differ in several respects, both organizations have at 
their heart the concept of collective security and the maintenance of peace. World war 
amongst great powers is the worst calamity that must be prevented. Crisis actions are 
important, but not at the expense of lessening the impact of the organizations which have 
assisted the avoidance of large-scale conflict by great powers over the last sixty years.  
Each organization’s multilateral decision making process is effective for the 
designs of which it was created, and in this case for crisis action as well. In the Libya 
case, they both succeeded in decisive action to support a “just” crisis action response. The 
future will tell if it was effective in the long term. Both organizations succeeded in 
reinforcing their primary purpose by effectively coordinating state action with respect to 
the principles which guide their structure and avoiding significant conflict between 
influential and powerful states. Both organizations are stronger and more effective, not 
just because they acted on Libya, but because they acted in accordance with their 
principles, their primary purpose, and with the maintenance of their structural integrity in 
mind. 
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What is the future of multilateralism in world security with no end of violence in 
nations and between nations? A search of the term in scholarly journals reveals that the 
term is only significantly used as an explanative concept in papers that have 
multilateralism as its topic. However, by the definition provided, multilateralism is 
intimately involved in the structure of contemporary international relations and the 
importance of this process is growing. Despite the fact that it is taken for granted as an 
integral part of modern institutionalism, continued investigation of its nature, form, and 
effect remains a major assignment for scholars and makers of policy in search of 
understanding of the character of events around them.243  
The question remains if multilateralism, as an organizing principle for interstate 
affairs, can provide stability in light of the changing nature of global power and the 
emergence of additional great powers in the international arena? Can multilateralism 
survive a multipolar structure? To this question, the history of U.S. proponency of 
multilateralism as the means to create a multipolar structure in the aftermath of WWII 
provides some clues to previous thought on the topic. It was widely believed then that 
only a multipolar structure would provide international stability. Sixty years later, with 
increased interdependence, this presumption is questioned anew. Perhaps it is not merely 
the pole structure of the international system which affects its stability, but rather the 
organizing principles by which its actors choose to interrelate on serious affairs? 
Examples include the multilateral ends of NATO, which provides security as an 
indivisible good for its members despite a reliance on U.S. leadership. The European 
Union serves as an example of the largest experiment of states’ willingness to reduce 
their own sovereignty for the concept of diffuse reciprocity. The EU’s Common Security 
and Defense Policy represents the modern emergence of the multilateral form on the most 
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of contemporary domestic politics on each individual member’s behavior. All of these topics are 
worthwhile areas of future study that may yield additional insight into this case as more information is 
made available. 
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serious of topics—security and defense. This change is taking place under the most 
challenging of circumstances: conflicted support by the United States and forced reliance 
on NATO. Additionally, the UN remains a significant multilateral forum for debate on an 
increasing number of topics that effect large numbers of states and the global commons. 
The examples of these institutions, their growing influence, and their increasing reliance 
on principles of accepted conduct, provides some evidence that multilateralism will 
remain a central tenet of stable international relations as power relationships change and 
states rise and fall in influence. 
The United States, as the world hegemon, remains a considerable variable when it 
comes to the future of its engagement in multilateral form. The gap between the U.S.’s 
power and its global influence has been widening.244 However, the United States has an 
insatiable desire for continual innovation. This desire underpins the success and stability 
of its economic model and drives its influence to every section of the world. The United 
States may improve its reputation, and it may be that a harkening back to its 
unconditional support for multilateralism will provide the tools for it to do so. Regarding 
America’s need to restore its influence, Richard Holbrooke said, “restoring respect for 
American values and leadership is essential not because it is nice to be popular but 
because respect is a precondition for legitimate leadership and enduring influence.”245 
The United States needs to lead the innovative efforts to shape the world in the image it 
desires it to reflect—as if the United States were no longer the military and economic 
power it now is. These are the considerations that shaped American foreign policy 
experts in the post-WWII era when they incorporated multilateralism as a means to create 
a multipolar world. They are the considerations that should be incorporated today. The 
world is too interdependent to do otherwise. 
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